Joris van Eijnatten’s critique of our view of ‘directional pluralism’ touches on matters central to Pluralisms and Horizons. It is a honour to have our book subjected to such a careful and sensitive reading. Some of the points he raises we want to keep thinking about, but others are so pivotal to our account — as well as, we believe, to Reformational philosophy as a whole — that a prompt answer is called for. Therefore, we welcome this opportunity for a (...) public response. (shrink)

At the law side of the creation, the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea distinguishes between natural laws, values and norms. Natural laws are coercive both for human beings and for any other subject or object. Like natural laws, values or normative principles belong to the creation, being universal and invariable. Both people and associations are subject to values, which they can obey or disobey. Values characterize the relation frames following the natural ones. Norms are man-made realizations of values, historically and (...) culturally different. Philosophical ethics investigates the normativity of human acts. This paper argues that ethics cannot be related to a single relation frame and that the designation ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ modal aspect is a misnomer. (shrink)

It is a biblical faith position that followers of the Christ should give away the bread they bake freely , rather than try to force your neighbour to accept it. Maybe the others only eat cake, or hard-boiled arguments. If the neighbours, however, need and ask for nutritious bread, we rich Christians are called by God to provide wholesome food for thought as well as bellies, says Scripture, with a gentleness, respect for the stranger, and with a sound, self-critical consciousness (...) that may involve our getting hurt ourselves. (shrink)

In this article, following an indication of Meijer C. Smit, I make a basic distinction between the first and the second history. By the first history I mean history as we experience it from within on the basis of personal interest and active involvement in our historical past. The second history is history as academics construct it on the basis of critical research into historical facts. The central question that arises is that of how these two paradigms of history are (...) related. I discuss commemoration as one of the most telling expressions of our involvement in the first history. I analyze it as a hermeneutic, dialogical, and anamnetic experience contrasting anamnetic and academic history as experienced versus constructed history: is the latter value-free? I conclude with the question whether we must regard commemoration as serviceable to the project of academic history or the latter as serviceable to commemoration. (shrink)