National University of «Kyiv-Mohyla academy» MEETING THE OTHER AS A CHALLENGE 15th International Conference “Philosophy: the New Generation” Summaries of Reports Kyiv, NaUKMA, April 21–22, 2023 .

The radical redefinition of the landscape of physics that followed the contributions of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg at the start of the 20th century led to plethora [of] new perspectives on age-old metaphysical questions on determinism and the nature of reality. The main contention of this article is that the work of Gilbert Simondon - whose magnum opus possesses a scope uniting the most basic philosophical concerns with the most recent breakthroughs in natural sciences - is highly relevant for (...) an adequate understanding of the split between determinism and indeterminism, as well as the underlying presuppositions which have driven some influential contributions to this topic. To this end, the article shows that the more deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics offered by David Bohm and Louis de Broglie proves to be a valuable reference point for a more precise use and understanding of Simondon'ss transductive logic - especially when its philosophical lapses are considered closely. Finally, following the considerations of both thinkers, we aim at a more precise reconsideration of the stakes of indeterminism in modern physics, as well as a restructuration of what is often understood as a polarization. (shrink)

In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari saw the difficulty of disentangling the question of Spinoza and, later, of Reich from the very limit of a system of representation by which they mean Oedipus. As A Thousand Plateaus would emphasize later, this limit brings out the question of the desire for democracy (‘democracies are majorities’). It desires Oedipus. In What Is Philosophy?, the limit question (Oedipus) gave way to the concept of a people to come. Fifty years since its publication, Anti-Oedipus remains (...) a relevant text (apropos of its ‘strategic adversary’ identified by Foucault) against the background of the social pathology of neofascism, populist politics, and the rise of the alt-right and neoconservative movements in recent years. The paper tries to locate this inflexion point where the desire for democracy modulates into the bi-univocal plasticity of Oedipal desire whose dangers people already seem to know. They have unmasked Oedipus’ double impasse and have escaped it. They no longer desire fascism; they desire fascists, neocons, and right-leaning mob rousers. Fifty years since its publication, Anti-Oedipus confronts a type of people who have learned to behave like the enemies of capitalism, too careful not to overload desire and destroy its bi-univocality, its great balancing act on the Body without organs. Incidentally, in ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control,’ Deleuze spoke about a people who know how to ‘surf’ replacing the ‘older sports.’ This applies to people who could become either schizoidal or regress to its more familiar inversion, the simulacra of Oedipus. (shrink)

We contemplate Deleuze and Guattari's discussion of in/compossibility through engagement with practices of spatial planning and development at the urban fringe in Australia. In such sites of ecosystem transformation, the presence of wildlife, such as mosquitoes, is often deemed incompossible with felicitous human habitation. We suggest that regarding worlds like those of mosquitoes and humans as divergent, rather than incompossible, opens up opportunities for inclusive disjunctive syntheses which affirm the disjoined terms without excluding one from the other. Relating inclusive disjunction (...) to intensive milieu, we call for development of a more milieu-based approach to planning to facilitate more-than-human coexistence differently. (shrink)

Some variants of Object-Oriented Ontology define entities in terms of their powers. Such variants are rooted in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s theory of “machinic assemblages”. This article asks whether such entities can be metaphysical primitives with regard to similarity and change. This is the case if no further existents are needed to account for these two features of reality. According to Levi Bryant’s machine-oriented ontology, entities defined in terms of powers are such primitives. According to Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory, (...) they are not. DeLanda therefore holds that further metaphysical primitives must exist. After reconstructing the key features of the theories involved, I argue that Bryant’s position is ultimately more parsimonious, and that DeLanda’s theory confuses epistemological models with ontological realities. (shrink)

In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social theory theorizes them as inert, resilient entities with a private reality that exceeds their components and actions. Harman’s theory focuses on what social entities are qua objects, and consequently says little about their specificity as social objects. A (...) more complete social theory would also outline how human existence is to be understood in relation to a social world comprised of discrete and inert entities, as opposed to, for example, far more continuous material fields or networks of associations. We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation. We first outline Harman’s and Sartre’s respective ontologies of social objects, and then discuss how their many complementarities make the latter a suitable extension of the former. (shrink)

The status of continuity in Deleuze’s metaphysics is a subject of debate. Deleuze calls the virtual, in Difference and Repetition, an Ideal continuum, and the differential relations that constitute the Ideal imply the continuity of this field. But, Deleuze does not hesitate to formulate the same field by the affirmation of divergence (incompossibility) that can be regarded as a form of discontinuity. It is, hence, unclear how these two ostensibly contradictory accounts might reconcile. This article attempts to reconstitute a Deleuzian (...) theory of continuity through Leibniz, whose philosophy is equally subject to a tension between the law of continuity, prevalent in his mathematics and metaphysics, and the discontinuity or absolute individuality of monads. By reorienting The Fold around the motif of continuity a new conceptual space is opened for continuity qua heterogeneity-and-inseparability. Then, enfolding the conceptual personae of The Fold onto Difference and Repetition reveals the tacit though decisive presence of different types of continuity operational in Deleuze’s metaphysics that will be called divergent, intensive, torsional, and tenorsional continuities. (shrink)

Graham Harman writes that the “basic dualism in the world lies…between things in their intimate reality and things as confronted by other things.” However, dualism implies irreconcilable difference; what Harman points to is better expressed as a dyad, where the two components imply one another and interact. This article shows that systems theory has long asserted the fundamental character of Harman’s dyad, expressing it as the union of internal structure and external function, which correspond exactly to what Levi Bryant, characterizing (...) Harman’s views, refers to as the intra-ontic and the inter-ontic, respectively. After interpreting Harman’s dyad in terms of the ontology of systems theory, the article illustrates his dyad with a variety of examples, including conceptions about truth, ethics, value, and intelligence. The structure–function dyad is a spatial conception of a system as an object. It is usefully augmented with a temporal dimension, expressed in a third component or with an additional orthogonal dyad. Adding a temporal dyad to the structure–function dyad joins the idea of an event and/or process to the idea of an object. (shrink)

While Continental thought has no shortage of criticism and diagnosis of social, political, and ethical issues, it tends to avoid offering guidance on what to do about such issues. In Reconsidering the Life of Power, Garrison argues for a radical new alternative for the Continental tradition: it ought to stage an encounter with the Confucian tradition. This is because, he argues, both traditions have at the center of their political thought a focus on the social formation of subjects, that is, (...) the process of subjectivation. While Continental thought often takes this process to empty the subject of all but nominal forms of autonomy, the Confucian tradition sees subjectivation as the very source of real human autonomy. This paper explores one such possible encounter by synthesizing Deleuze’s account of individuation with the constructivist reading of Xunzi’s view that artifice is the source of human autonomy and virtue. Ultimately, I argue that coupling Deleuze’s defense of the possibility of the New with Xunzi’s transformational account of human nature provides an understanding of subjectivation that is optimistic about the shaping of human autonomy as well as practical guidance for how to do so. (shrink)

I argue against the use of general ‘ism’ terms such as ‘speculative realism’ and ‘correlationism’ by Harman. This use is contrasted with more nuanced readings of philosophers, referring to Bryant and DeLanda’s more subtle versions of materialism that do not fit the general label. Instead of general categories I defend Deleuze’s use of the concept of problem as studied by Bell. This argument is then developed through a close reading of Logic of Sense, against Harman’s denial of the reality of (...) relations and processes. I demonstrate that Deleuze is not a correlationist as defined by Harman, by following Sauvagnargues, Smith and Beistegui on the concepts of event and simulacrum in Logic of Sense. I then consider Deleuze’s study of language and his argument that designation, signification and manifestation rely on the concept of sense. This argument leads to a position which is neither idealism, nor materialism, because the differential processes at work in sense cannot be reduced to matter or to the subject, working instead between them and denying their independent reality. (shrink)