There exists a longstanding debate over the global institutional implications of Immanuel Kant's political philosophy: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government, or instead only a co...

An influential interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of Right suggests that the relationship between public right and freedom is constitutive rather than instrumental. The focus has been on domestic right and members’ relations to their own state. This has resulted in a statist bias which has not adequately dealt with the fact that Kant regards public right as a system composed of three levels – domestic, international and cosmopolitan right. This article suggests that the constitutive relationship is between all levels of (...) right, on the one hand, and ‘freedom in the external relation’ of all human beings, on the other hand. (shrink)

Although Kant argues that a world republic with coercive public law is the only rational way to secure a lawful cosmopolitan condition, he states that it is an unachievable ideal, and he proposes a voluntary, non-coercive federation of states as a substitute. While some scholars have criticized Kant for moving away from this ideal due merely to pragmatic considerations, I argue that his rejection of a coercive world republic is based on his conception of state sovereignty and what is required (...) for a lawful condition. I consider how we can institutionalize a lawful condition between states without a coercive world republic in ways that go beyond Kant’s voluntary federation. I also consider how we can resolve this dilemma in Kant’s account to support a federal world republic. (Published online first on June 16, 2014). (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a political reading of Religion within the boundaries of mere reason. For this I will examine the way in which Kant’s international law is applied in the ethical-legal parallel in this work. In the first place, I will show that although Kant uses in Religion the term “republic” to refer to the association of States, however, he does not hold the model of a world republic for international law, but rather of a (...) Federation of States. In the second place, I will show that Kant does not hold a state analogy with international law, but an ethical-legal analogy between the ethical community and the international legal condition under the free Federation of States and cosmopolitan right. Finally, I will present the sense in which this analogy exposes Kant's idea of progress for existing political communities. (shrink)

: Most contemporary attempts to draw inspiration from Kant's cosmopolitan project focus exclusively on the prescriptive recommendations he makes in his article, ‘On Perpetual Peace’. In this essay, I argue that there is more to his cosmopolitan point of view than his normative agenda. Kant has a unique and interesting way of problematizing the way individuals and peoples relate to one another on the stage of world history, based on a notion that human beings who share the earth in common (...) ‘originally’ constitute a ‘commercium’ of thoroughgoing interaction. By unpacking this concept of ‘commercium’, we can uncover in Kant a more critical perspective on world history that sets up the cosmopolitan as a specific kind of historical-political challenge. I will show that we can distinguish this level of problematization from the prescriptive level at which Kant formulates his familiar recommendations in ‘Perpetual Peace’. I will further show how his particular way of framing the cosmopolitan problematic can be expanded and expatiated upon to develop a more critical, reflexive, and open-ended conception of cosmopolitan thinking. (shrink)

This article presents a defense of Kant’s idea of a league of states. Kant’s proposal that rightful or just international relations can be achieved within the framework of such a league is often criticized for being at odds with his overall theory. In view of the analogy he draws between an interpersonal and an international state of nature, it is often argued that he should have opted for the idea of a state of states. Agreeing with this standard criticism that (...) a league of states cannot establish the institutional framework for international justice, others also suggest an alternative stage model interpretation. According to this interpretation, Kant’s true ideal is in fact a state of states, whereas the league is merely introduced as a temporary and second best solution. In contrast to both the standard criticism and the stage model interpretation, I argue that fundamental normative concerns count in favour of a league rather than a state of states. I also argue that Kant’s defense of such a league is consistent with his position on the institutional preconditions for just interaction in the domestic case because of crucial relevant differences between the state of nature among individuals and the external relations between states. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy has enjoyed renewed attention as an egalitarian alternative to contemporary inequality since it seems to uncompromisingly reassert the primacy of the state over the economy, enabling it to defend the modern welfare state against encroaching neoliberal markets. However, I argue that, when understood as a free-standing approach to politics, Kant’s doctrine of right shares essential features with the prevailing theories that legitimate really existing economic inequality. Like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, Kant understands the state’s function (...) as essentially coercive and, in justifying state coercion, he adopts a narrow conception of political freedom that formally preserves the right to choose while denying that the range of choices one actually has can be a matter of justice. As a result, Kant cannot identify various forms of social pressure as potential injustices even as he recognizes their power to create and sustain troubling inequalities. For both Kant and the neoliberals, the result is that economic relations almost never count as unjust forms of coercion, no matter how unequal they are. Views that identify coercion as the trigger for duties of justice are thus particularly ill-suited to orient us to contemporary inequality. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on the way Kant's distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue operates at the interstate level. I argue that his Right of Nations (V ölkerrecht) can be interpreted as a duty to establish a kind of interstate distributive justice (that is, as a duty to secure states in their independence and territorial possessions), which is called for to secure domestic distributive justice and to protect individuals' freedom and private property. Or at least this is 'ideal (...) theory' for, as I specify, this cosmopolitan linkage is compromised by Kant's endeavour to accomodate the existence of non-republican states. (shrink)

Most people assume that the natural resources of a country belong to its people. Theorists of cosmopolitan resource justice have recently questioned this assumption, arguing that extensive rights of peoples over natural resources cannot be justified. In response, defences of peoples’ resource rights, grounded in the value of self-determination, have been tepid. This paper argues against both positions. It advances the distinct thesis that popular resource sovereignty is justified as the resource rights allocation that maximizes well-being. This consequentialist account provides (...) superior normative foundations for peoples’ resource rights. (shrink)

In this essay, I first outline the contexts in which the idea of cosmopolitanism appears in Kant's moral and political philosophy. I then survey the three main debates regarding his political cosmopolitanism, namely, on the nature of the international federation he advocated, his theory of cosmopolitan right, and his views on colonialism and ‘race’, and I consider the relation between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in Kant's work. I subsequently discuss Kant's moral cosmopolitanism. Kant is widely held to be a defender of (...) moral cosmopolitanism, but the terminology of world citizenship is in fact strikingly rare in Kant's writings on moral theory. I offer a two-part explanation for why this is the case. (shrink)

International law has one principal mechanism for settling the legality of humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security Council's power to authorise coercion. However, this is hardly satisfactory in practice and has failed to provide a more secure juridical basis for determining significant conflicts among states over when humanitarian force is justified. This article argues that, in spite of Immanuel Kant's limited analysis of intervention, and his silence on humanitarian intervention, his political theory provides the elements of a compelling analysis on (...) this topic. Five components of Kant's roadmap towards perpetual peace and an eventual world republic give conditional support for humanitarian intervention even in imperfect juridical conditions. This support is conditional on the achievement of juridical progress within and among states and has implications for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship. From Kant we learn that, ultimately, humanitarian intervention should become a matter of coercive law enforcement rather than an ethical question of ‘saving strangers’. (shrink)

Kant’s 1795 essay on perpetual peace has been lauded as one of his most important and influential political texts as well as one of the most important texts on peace. Kant’s text was largely forgotten until the 1980s and 1990s, with numerous commentaries appearing around the time of its 200 years existence. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s interest in Kant’s text appears to have arisen around the same time, and his analyses of this text continued after the turn of the (...) century. The references to Kant’s essay in Derrida’s texts appear mostly in the context of a discussion of the concept of hospitality. The latter concept is understood by Derrida as including both a demand for absolute hospitality, that is, hospitality without the imposition of any limitations, as well as a demand, in the interests of survival, for such limitations or conditions. A negotiation between these dimensions of hospitality is ultimately required. The aim of this article is to elucidate Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s essay, specifically his recasting of the concept of peace as absolute hospitality, as well as to briefly outline its implications for international and cosmopolitan law. (shrink)

This article suggests that Tagore’s conception of cosmopolitan education can provide the basis for advancing matters of global social justice, when considering the problem posed by Nancy Fraser in her essay ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World’: ‘How can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation within a post-Westphalian frame?’. To this end, the article briefly reflects on the perspective of cosmopolitanism, setting the scene for an exploration of Tagore’s distinctive cosmopolitan educational philosophy. The article develops the argument that (...) framing pedagogy centred on Tagore’s principles of cosmopolitan education to produce cosmopolitan-minded citizens can help bring about social, political, and economic change at local, national, and international level, in order to integrate the three-dimensional struggle for social justice outlined by Fraser. The article concludes by suggesting what can be done at the institutional and curriculum levels to help foster the cosmopolitan attitude. (shrink)

A focus on the presence of unjustified coercion is one of the central normative concerns of Kant’s entire practical philosophy, from the ethical to the cosmopolitical. This focus is intimately interconnected with Kant’s account of sovereignty, since only the sovereign can justifiably coerce others unconditionally. For Kant, the sovereign is she who has the rightful authority to legislate laws and who is subject only to the laws that she gives herself. In the moral realm (or kingdom) of ends, each citizen (...) is both a member of that realm and an equal co-sovereign of its categorically binding laws (GMS, 4:433-34, Reath 2006, p. 5). As such, each citizen is 'subject to the moral law' only insofar as she is 'at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only for that reason subordinated to it' (GMS, 4:440). But when Kant comes to think about sovereignty in the political sphere, a number of tensions emerge. These tensions emerge because a doctrine of absolutist popular sovereignty, according to which the people are the ultimate holders of sovereignty, seems to be implied by Kant’s underlying normative theory. However, Kant also makes numerous explicit statements which seem to imply a doctrine of absolutist ruler sovereignty, according to which the ruler is the ultimate holder of sovereignty. And this seems inconsistent. However, despite the appearance of inconsistency I shall argue, by exploring the issues of civil disobedience and cosmopolitan peace, that Kant consistently defends an account of absolutist popular sovereignty which is compatible with his core normative commitments. Exploring these issues will also illuminate Kant’s political teleology by showing us the political ends towards which we should work and the means by which we should pursue them. (shrink)