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C. I. Lewis was a Foundationalist After All

Griffin Klemick

History of Philosophy Quarterly 37 (1):77-99 (2020)

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Sellars's Core Critique of C. I. Lewis: Against the Equation of Aboutness with Givenness.Griffin Klemick - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1):106-136.details Many have taken Sellars’s critique of empiricism in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) to be aimed at his teacher C. I. Lewis. But if so, why do the famous arguments of its opening sections carry so little force against Lewis’s views? Understandably, some respond by denying that Lewis’s epistemology is among the positions targeted by Sellars. But this is incorrect. Indeed, Sellars had earlier offered more trenchant (if already familiar) critiques of Lewis’s epistemology. What is original about EPM (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
What is the myth of the given?James R. O’Shea - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10543-10567.details The idea of ‘the given’ and its alleged problematic status as most famously articulated by Sellars continues to be at the center of heated controversies about foundationalism in epistemology, about ‘conceptualism’ and nonconceptual content in the philosophy of perception, and about the nature of the experiential given in phenomenology and in the cognitive sciences. I argue that the question of just what the myth of the given is supposed to be in the first place is more complex than has typically (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Quine’s critique of C. I. Lewis: pragmatism, psychologism, and naturalism—a response to Quine, conceptual pragmatism, and the analytic-synthetic distinction (Robert Sinclair, 2022).Carl B. Sachs - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details I argue that Quine’s naturalization of Lewis’s Kantian pragmatism should be understood in terms of Lewis’s attempt to de-psychologize pragmatist epistemology. Lewis wants epistemology to be a priori in order to be distinct from psychology. Quine’s criticisms of Lewis result in a picture that weakens the distinction between epistemology and psychology. Nevertheless, Quine’s naturalized Kantian pragmatism remains far more Kantian than is widely recognized, due to what Quine retains from Lewis. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
What We Talk About When We Talk About This Being Blue.Matthias Neuber - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (1).details The relationship between American pragmatism and American critical realism needs to be reconsidered. The two currents shared many aspects, but there were also significant differences. One of these differences pertains to the object of perception or, more precisely, to the question of what we talk about when we talk about this, for example, being blue. By re-addressing that question, some light can be shed on the historical development of analytic philosophy in the United States during the first half of the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
C.I. Lewis: Pragmatist or Reductionist?Jacob Browning - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (2):109-126.details Despite its substantial influence, there is surprisingly little agreement about how to read C.I. Lewis’s Mind and the World Order. Lewis has historically been read as a reductionist attempting to g... Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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