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  1. Categories for the Neologicist.Shay Allen Logan - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (1):26-44.
    Abstraction principles provide implicit definitions of mathematical objects. In this paper, an abstraction principle defining categories is proposed. It is unsatisfiable and inconsistent in the expected ways. Two restricted versions of the principle which are consistent are presented.
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  • Logical Form and the Development of Russell’s Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2022 - In F. Boccuni & A. Sereni (eds.), Origins and Varieties of Logicism. Routledge. pp. 147–166.
    Logicism is the view that mathematical truths are logical truths. But a logical truth is commonly thought to be one with a universally valid form. The form of “7 > 5” would appear to be the same as “4 > 6”. Yet one is a mathematical truth, and the other not a truth at all. To preserve logicism, we must maintain that the two either are different subforms of the same generic form, or that their forms are not at all (...)
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  • A Generic Russellian Elimination of Abstract Objects.Kevin C. Klement - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (1):91-115.
    In this paper I explore a position on which it is possible to eliminate the need for postulating abstract objects through abstraction principles by treating terms for abstracta as ‘incomplete symbols’, using Russell's no-classes theory as a template from which to generalize. I defend views of this stripe against objections, most notably Richard Heck's charge that syntactic forms of nominalism cannot correctly deal with non-first-orderizable quantifcation over apparent abstracta. I further discuss how number theory may be developed in a system (...)
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  • The aim of Russell’s early logicism: a reinterpretation.Anders Kraal - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-18.
    I argue that three main interpretations of the aim of Russell’s early logicism in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) are mistaken, and propose a new interpretation. According to this new interpretation, the aim of Russell’s logicism is to show, in opposition to Kant, that mathematical propositions have a certain sort of complete generality which entails that their truth is independent of space and time. I argue that on this interpretation two often-heard objections to Russell’s logicism, deriving from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (...)
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  • Russell and the Neo-Logicists.Sébastien Gandon - 2017 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 25:1-21.
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  • Tracks of Relations and Equivalences-based Reasoning.G. Shtakser & L. Leonenko - 2011 - Studia Logica 97 (3):385-413.
    It is known that the Restricted Predicate Calculus can be embedded in an elementary theory, the signature of which consists of exactly two equivalences. Some special models for the mentioned theory were constructed to prove this fact. Besides formal adequacy of these models, a question may be posed concerning their conceptual simplicity, "transparency" of interpretations they assigned to the two stated equivalences. In works known to us these interpretations are rather complex, and can be called "technical", serving only the purpose (...)
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