La “relación” en Tomás de Aquino es una de las “categorías” aristotélicas que representan “accidentes”. No obstante, tal compromiso metafísico conlleva algunas dificultades ya que el esquema “sustancia”-“accidentes” no deja lugar a la idea de un “término medio” entre dos cosas. En este artículo presento algunas tensiones entre la sistematización de la “relación” como categoría en Tomás de Aquino y su posición sobre el “estatus” de los predicamentos en general. Para ello analizo primero la deducción de las categorías tal como (...) es presentada por el autor para luego abordar la “relación” de modo sistemático. En esta exposición argumento que Tomás tiene severas dificultades para asignarle un “fundamento accidental propio” distinto al de los otros predicamentos que le permita considerarla una de las “categorías”. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aquinas's conception of the human soul and intellect offers a consistent alternative to the dilemma of materialism and post-Cartesian dualism. It also argues that in their own theoretical context, Aquinas' arguments for the materiality of the human soul and immateriality of the intellect provide a strong justification of his position. However, that theoretical context is rather "alien" to ours in contemporary philosophy. The conclusion of the paper will point in the direction of what can be done (...) to render Aquinas's position more palatable to contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only (...) in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception. (shrink)

This paper contrasts the Thomistic and Cartesian interpretations of what the substantial unity of the body and mind can consist in. A detailed discussion of the Thomistic account of the substantial unity of body and soul identifies especially those principles of the presupposed hylomorphist metaphysical background of this account that Descartes abandoned. After arguing for the consistency of the Thomistic view, briefly outlines how certain developments in late-medieval scholasticism prepared the way for the abandonment of precisely these principles. Finally, the (...) paper shows why from the perspective of the Thomistic principles identified in the first part, Descartes has to appear as someone paying mere lip-service to the thesis of the substantial unity of body and mind. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to present in complete and accurate way one of the possible positions, i.e nondeflationary treatment of existence, in an interesting metaphysical dispute – the dispute over the status of existence. Moreover, the arguments and thesis from historically distinct periods are analysed to show that the knowledge of the history of philosophy is not a ballast. On the contrary, it can be creatively used in the contemporary discussion and deepen the understanding of this issue. -/- (...) The issue of the truth and the search for a proper description of reality has played a central role already in the very beginnings of philosophical research. However, reflection on the existence remained in the shadow of the drop-down theory of being and related theory of essence. At that time was developed (to the fullest extent expressed by Aristotle) a deflationary (reductionist) theory, according to which existence is not real, because it does not add anything to the essence which was identified with a being. Mere existence, as a part of reality that requires knowledge and examination, appeared later, in the era of flourishing Arab (Muslim and Jewish) and Latin philosophy, in the context of the philosophical study of the nature of God the Creator, who creates a whole reality out of nothingness. At that time the first metaphysical theories appeared, in which the existence was recognised as a real, irreducible element of reality. -/- In this paper the history of extracting the non-reductionist theories of existence (in which it is treated as a real ‘component’ of being) is presented, with particular attention to the position of St. Thomas Aquinas as the creator of one of the most mature version of these theories. Subsequently, based on the example of the main representatives, the scholastic debate over the so-called ‘real difference’ (centred around the merits of maintaining the non-deflationary position) is shown. In the last section the contemporary debate over the existence is presented, with a focus on philosophers appealing (affirmatively or critically) to the theory of Aquinas. -/- The presentation is mainly historical. Metaphysical theories, within which the status of the existence is recognised in different ways, are considered. The main point of reference is the doctrine of esse of Aquinas (as a blueprint for non-deflationary approach to existence), which is juxtaposed with the positions of other philosophers, i.e. with the classical (Aristotle, Godfrey of Fontaines) and contemporary reductionism (Frege, Russell, Quine, Kenny) and also other types of non-reductionist theories (Avicenna, Giles of Rome, Geach, Miller). The main conclusion is that the nondeflationary theory of Aquinas is coherent, plausible and still actual in XXI century. (shrink)