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Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality

In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154 (2021)

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  1. Knowledge and mentality.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):359-382.
    This paper reexamines the case for mentality — the thesis that knowledge is a mental state in its own right, and not only derivatively, simply by virtue of being composed out of mental states or by virtue of being a property of mental states — and explores a novel argument for it. I argue that a certain property singled out by psychologists and philosophers of cognitive science as distinctive of skillful behavior (agentive control) is best understood in terms of knowledge. (...)
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  • Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents.Markus Https://Orcidorg Kneer - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (10):e13032.
    The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary (...)
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  • About the Scope of Non-Observational Practical Knowledge.Xavier Castellà - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (3):339-359.
    I discuss the issue whether the kind of nonobservational knowledge about our intentional actions that can be detected in ideal, paradigmatic cases can also be present when the agent is not confident enough to believe she will succeed in fulfilling her intention. It might be tempting to assume that if the agent’s confidence about what she is doing is relevantly increased after some observation, then the acquired practical knowledge has to be observational. I argue that this is a wrong reaction. (...)
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