Communication and content presents a comprehensive and foundational account of meaning based on new versions of situation theory and game theory. The literal and implied meanings of an utterance are derived from first principles assuming little more than the partial rationality of interacting agents. New analyses of a number of diverse phenomena – a wide notion of ambiguity and content encompassing phonetics, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and beyond, vagueness, convention and conventional meaning, indeterminacy, universality, the role of truth in communication, semantic (...) change, translation, Frege’s puzzle of informative identities – are developed. Communication, speaker meaning, and reference are defined. Frege’s context and compositional principles are generalized and reconciled in a fixed-point principle, and a detailed critique of Grice, several aspects of Lewis, and some aspects of the Romantic conception of meaning are offered. Connections with other branches of linguistics, especially psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, historical linguistics, and natural language processing, are explored. -/- The book will be of interest to scholars in philosophy, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. It should also interest readers in related fields like literary and cultural theory and the social sciences. (shrink)

Philosophers have made numerous and varied attempts to analyse the concept of a miracle. To the end, an assortment of necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth an instantiation of a miracle have been offered. In this paper we discuss one of the most common of these conditions - the violation restriction. This restriction holds that all miracles involve a violation of a law of nature.

This study looks to the work of Tarski's mentors Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and reconsiders all of the major issues in Tarski scholarship in light of the conception of Intuitionistic Formalism developed: semantics, truth, paradox, logical consequence.

During his philosophical career Karl Popper sought to characterize natural laws alternately as strictly universal and as 'naturally' or 'physically' necessary statements. In this paper we argue that neither characterization does what Popper claimed and sketch a reconstruction of his views that avoids some of their major drawbacks.

It is often remarked that Indian logic (IL) has no conception of necessity. But what kind of necessity is absent in this system? Logical necessity is presumably absent: the structure of the logical argument in IL is often given as a reason for this claim. However even a cursory understanding of IL illustrates an abiding attempt to formulate the idea of necessity. In Dharmakīrti's classification of inferences, one can detect the formal process of entailment in the inferences arising from class (...) inclusion. In Western philosophy, Leibniz's invocation of 'contingent necessity' as distinguished from the 'necessary necessity' is part of a tradition that finds value in the idea of contingent necessity. In contemporary philosophy, this has been championed by Armstrong, specifically in the context of understanding the necessity inherent in scientific laws. In IL, the analysis of 'invariable concomitance' (vyāpti) is of crucial importance and its definitions are very complex. This paper argues how vyāpti can be understood in terms of contingent necessity and also how the complex definitions can be interpreted as an attempt to define contingent necessity in terms of 'logical' necessity. (shrink)

I argue that Beall and Restall's logical pluralism fails. Beall–Restall pluralism is the claim that there are different, equally correct logical consequence relations in a single language. Their position fails for two, related, reasons: first, it relies on an unmotivated conception of the ‘settled core’ of consequence: they believe that truth-preservation, necessity, formality and normativity are ‘settled’ features of logical consequence and that any relation satisfying these criteria is a logical consequence relation. I consider historical evidence and argue that their (...) position relies on an unmotivated conception of the settled features of logical consequence. There are many features that are just as settled but which are inconsistent with pluralism. Second, I argue that Beall–Restall pluralism fails to hold in a single language with a single selection of logical constants, which they require for the position to be distinct from Carnap's. I consider various ways in which Beall and Restall can resist this meaning variance, particularly for negation, but argue that the strongest way relies on an unmotivated conception of the settled features of the logical constants. (shrink)

In a series of publications beginning in the 1980s, John Etchemendy has argued that the standard semantical account of logical consequence, due in its essentials to Alfred Tarski, is fundamentally mistaken. He argues that, while Tarski's definition requires us to classify the terms of a language as logical or non-logical, no such division is guaranteed to deliver the correct extension of our pre-theoretical or intuitive consequence relation. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Tarski's account is claimed to be incapable of (...) explaining an essential modal/epistemological feature of consequence, namely, its necessity and apriority. Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) is widely recognized as having anticipated Tarski's definition in his Wissenschaftslehre (or Theory of Science ) of 1837. Because of the similarities between his account and Tarski's, Etchemendy's arguments have also been extended to cover Bolzano. The purpose of this article is to consider Bolzano's theory in the light of these criticisms. We argue that, due to important differences between Bolzano's and Tarski's theories, Etchemendy's objections do not apply immediately to Bolzano's account of consequence. Moreover, Bolzano's writings contain the elements of a detailed philosophical response to Etchemendy. (shrink)

An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to (...) reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many logical objects. (shrink)

Resumen En la filosofía de Lakatos existe una tensión entre falibilismo y optimismo epistemológico. En el presente artículo propongo la reconstrucción de dos elementos clave para resolver positivamente esa tensión: una noción de verdad empírica, que neutralice el convencionalismo, y una noción de verdad parcial, que dé cuenta de la creciente verosimilitud de los programas de investigación. Para esto último, reviso un aspecto de la obra de Lakatos frecuentemente ignorado por los críticos: su posición en el debate acerca de las (...) leyes de la naturaleza.There is a tension between fallibilism and epistemological optimism in Lakatos’s philosophy. This article proposes the reconstruction of two key elements to positively resolve such tension: a notion of empirical truth that could neutralize conventionalism, and a notion of partial truth, capable to account for the increasing verisimilitude of research programs. For the latter, I review one aspect of Lakatos’s work often ignored by the critics: his position on the debate regarding laws of nature. (shrink)

Genic selectionism holds that all selection can be understood as operating on particular genes. Critics (and conventional biological wisdom) insist that this misrepresents the actual causal structure of selective phenomena at higher levels of biological organization, but cannot convincingly defend this intuition. I argue that the real failing of genic selectionism is pragmatic – it prevents us from adopting the most efficient corpus of causal laws for predicting and intervening in the course of affairs – and I offer a Pragmatic (...) account of causation itself which ultimately bears out the claim that genic selectionism misrepresents the causal structure of selective contexts. (shrink)

This paper deals with Popper's little-known work on deductive logic, published between 1947 and 1949. According to his theory of deductive inference, the meaning of logical signs is determined by certain rules derived from ?inferential definitions? of those signs. Although strong arguments have been presented against Popper's claims (e.g. by Curry, Kleene, Lejewski and McKinsey), his theory can be reconstructed when it is viewed primarily as an attempt to demarcate logical from non-logical constants rather than as a semantic foundation for (...) logic. A criterion of logicality is obtained which is based on conjunction, implication and universal quantification as fundamental logical operations. (shrink)

Abstract It is argued that the problem of the necessity and projectability of laws may be solved by distinguishing between the fact of necessity and explanations of its nature. This reduces the problem of necessity to that of induction, which in consequences must be solved without reference to necessity using ?self?supporting? arguments. The consequences for the analysis of ?counterfactual conditionals and the problem of language dependence is discussed.

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the concept of natural necessity upon which the empirical causal type of a scientific law rests and to enlarge the notion of the conditions of a scientific law. According to regularity theory, what counts in the investigation of causation is the universality of causal proposition. So in this theory priority is given to the explication of the concept “scientific law”. Such an explication was provided by Popper in the first edition of his (...) Logik der Forschung. He defines here the concept “scientific law” by distinguishing between strictly universal propositions and numerical propositions. Later Popper, drawing upon W. Kneale´s criticism, proposed another definition of natural necessity. He expounds his revised view in Chapter X* of the new appendices of the Logic of Scientific Discovery by means of the famous moa-example. He views statement “All moas die before the age of fifty years” as not physically necessary because its truth depends on the presence of conditions different from singular initial conditions. Ba distinguishing between singular initial conditions and modification conditions I, contrary to Popper, claim that that statement can be viewed as naturally necessary. (shrink)