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  1. Artificial intelligence and responsibility gaps: what is the problem?Peter Königs - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (3):1-11.
    Recent decades have witnessed tremendous progress in artificial intelligence and in the development of autonomous systems that rely on artificial intelligence. Critics, however, have pointed to the difficulty of allocating responsibility for the actions of an autonomous system, especially when the autonomous system causes harm or damage. The highly autonomous behavior of such systems, for which neither the programmer, the manufacturer, nor the operator seems to be responsible, has been suspected to generate responsibility gaps. This has been the cause of (...)
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  • Punishment.Zachary Hoskins - 2016 - Analysis 77 (3):anw022.
    Philosophical writing about the legal practice of punishment has traditionally focused on two central questions: what (if anything) justifies the practice of tr.
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  • Een klimaat van woede: Waarom de woede van de klimaatbeweging productief kan zijn.Sigrid Wallaert - 2020 - Ethiek and Maatschappij 22 (1-2):33-55.
    Greta Thunberg has rapidly become a household name due to her passionate involvement in the youth climate movement. However, Thunberg has also received criticism, among other things for her anger. Is such anger really productive, people ask, or is it harming the cause of climate justice? In this article, I examine that question from a philosophical perspective. I look at two commonly mentioned disadvantages of anger, namely that it is a retributive emotion and that it reduces uptake of one’s message, (...)
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  • Bennett’s Expressive Justification of Punishment.Peter Chau - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):661-679.
    In this paper, I will critically assess the expressive justification of punishment recently offered by Christopher Bennett in The Apology Ritual and a number of papers. I will first draw a distinction between three conceptions of expression: communicative, motivational, and symbolic. After briefly demonstrating the difficulties of using the first two conceptions of expression to ground punishment and showing that Bennett does not ultimately rely on those two conceptions, I argue that Bennett’s account does not succeed because he fails to (...)
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