El artículo propone poner a prueba la idea comúnmente admitida de que en la concepción aristotélica las emociones tienen una función o fin en el ámbito biológico. Me propongo probar que esta concepción sería más propia de otras posturas, como la tomista y la cartesiana, y especialmente de la darwiniana y neo-darwiniana. Tras presentar en la sección 2 el tipo de explicaciones teleológicas que Aristóteles admite y emplea en biología, analizo en la parte 3 la concepción de las emociones de (...) Descartes y en especial de Darwin y muestro que ellas se adaptan bien al modelo explicativo teleológico aristotélico. En la sección 4, ofrezco varios argumentos con apoyo en los textos biológicos de Aristóteles para mostrar que, en cambio, este tipo de explicaciones teleológicas de las emociones no aparecen con claridad en los escritos biológicos del estagirita, toda vez que lo que encontramos allí es, más bien, explicaciones fisiológico materialistas del carácter de los animales. Por último, sugiero una asimetría con el tratamiento de las emociones desde el punto de vista de la racionalidad práctica que desarrollaré en trabajos ulteriores. (shrink)

Aunque las emociones se encuentran en el núcleo de quienes somos, su naturaleza y estructura continúa siendo hoy en día un amplio campo de investigación para diferentes disciplinas científicas. No obstante, como muchos otros temas de investigación actual, las emociones tienen unos antecedentes, una historia que conviene tener presente para ubicar los conceptos, los debates y las diversas aproximaciones teóricas en el marco cultural y las tradiciones de pensamiento que les dieron origen. En este artículo, realizaremos un breve recorrido por (...) la historia de las emociones en la época antigua de tal manera que el lector pueda reconocer, a grandes rasgos, las interpretaciones y posturas originales que desencadenaron diversas comprensiones teóricas en torno a estos fenómenos físicos y mentales que conforman nuestra existencia. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...) which the literature generally imputes to him. He is not explicating what we would call the “mental”—the private, inner realm which some take to be of a di erent kind than the physical—as most take him to be. His explanandum is content acquisition; the explanans is showing how the body becomes like various aspects of objects. Although he famously describes the mind (nous) as unmixed with the body, he is guided by functional constrains—nous cannot be limited or qualified if it is to potentially think all things. Thus, his inquiry into cognition is philosophically limited from a contemporary perspective. Aristotle is not doing philosophy of mind, for he doesn’t seem to find the “mental” philosophically perplexing. (shrink)

Augustine’s theory of first movements has provoked many controversies over the years. When discussing Augustine’s position in preliminary passions, some scholars maintain that he misunderstands the Stoics, whereas some others argue that he grasps their works rather well and his accounts are consistent with Stoic teaching. This article examines how Augustine transforms his predecessors’ conception of first movements into his own theory, with particular focus on whether Augustine misinterprets his predecessor’s doctrine in his approach. The first section introduces the recent (...) disputations on Augustine’s misunderstanding of the Stoic concept of the first movements. The second section compares Augustine’s opinions in his early, middle, and late writings to determine whether changes occur in his interpretation. Based on the above observations, this essay argues that Augustine is familiar with the Stoic doctrines, but in his later works, he ‘deliberately’ deviates from their concept of the first movements in order to refute their ‘pride’ and to defend his Christian position on the psychology of preliminary passions. These deliberate new changes of terms by Augustine do not derive from a misunderstanding, but rather follow from his attempt at constructing a new dynamic theological framework of addressing passions during his later thought. The article concludes with a third section that revisits the modern critiques and responds with a consideration of the significance of Augustine’s views on preliminary passions. (shrink)

Louis Charland's ‘Technological reason and the regulation of emotion’ focuses on a specific area, that of the emotions, in which he sees a problematic dominance of the technical attitude. He argues that our technologically oriented psychiatry has taken an instrumentalist approach to regulation of emotion that severely limits and distorts the role of emotion in psychiatric practice. A prominent example is the exclusion of moral judgments and values, emotion-laden aspects of experience, from psychotherapy because they do not fit the technical (...) model. To illustrate his point, Charland both contrasts the modern notion of emotion with the traditional notion of passion, and our contemporary practice of technically regulated emotion with the ‘moral treatment’ of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the (...) transient, changeable, valenced feelings that flow between perceptions and constitute their felt nature and impulse. The latter are the particular passions fully realized, with characteristic valence, and analyzed by Hume in terms of their particular belief structures and relations between ideas and impressions understood to be constituent of particular passions. The term ‘emotion’ for Hume generally denotes either the attending feeling, sometimes distinct from the passion (particularly as ‘passion’ is being used to include the associated beliefs, causes and objects), or as a synonym for a particular passion, typically when Hume is primarily referring to the felt nature of the passion. Generally speaking, ‘passion’ is a more cognitive category of affective mental state, while ‘emotion’ is more sensationalist. I will further argue that when we grant Hume the emotion/passion distinction, he can accommodate both highly sensationalist and highly cognitivist understandings of affective mental states. I finish with the application of my distinction to two key topics in Hume studies: his sympathy mechanism, and his theory of belief and motivation. (shrink)

En la filosofía y la psicología moral existe una discusión actualmente de vital importancia, esto es la relación entre moral y emociones. Después de una larga tradición de pensamiento en donde los procesos de justificación moral se asociaron con el valor normativo de la razón, hoy en día asistimos a una nueva orientación que defiende la integración de aspectos cognitivos y emocionales dentro del análisis de la acción moral y los compromisos ciudadanos. En este contexto, Martha Nussbaum, con su teoría (...) cognitivo-evaluadora de las emociones, aporta una original reflexión ética centrada en lo que ha denominado el juicio eudaimonista ligado al florecimiento de la persona y la comprensión de una vida humana buena. Esta visión posibilita entender las emociones como advertidores de vulnerabilidad, sufrimiento y dignidad humana menoscabada, en momentos en que miles de hombres y mujeres se sumergen en lo infrahumano. In moral philosophy and psychology there is currently discussion of vital importance, this is the relationship between morality and emotions. After a long tradition of thought in which the processes of moral justification were associated with the normative value of reason, today we are witnessing a new orientation that defends the integration of cognitive and emotional aspects within the analysis of moral action and citizen commitments. In this context, Martha Nussbaum, with her cognitive appraisal theory of emotions, contributes an original ethical reflection focused on what has been called the eudaimonist judgment linked to the flowering of the person and understanding of a good human life. This vision makes it possible to understand the emotions as warners of vulnerability, suffering and human dignity undermined, at a time when thousands of men and women are immersed in the subhuman. (shrink)

While interest in the emotion of awe has surged in psychology, philosophers have yet to devote a single self-standing article to awe’s conceptual contours and moral standing. The present article aims to rectify this imbalance and begin to make up for the unwarranted philosophical neglect. In order to do so, awe is given the standard Aristotelian treatment to uncover its conceptual contours and moral relevance. Aristotelianism typically provides the most useful entry point to ‘size up’ any emotion – more problematically (...) here, however, as Aristotle did not himself explicitly identify awe. The article critiques and proposes to improve upon existing psychological conceptual analyses of awe, probes the question why Aristotle ignored it and addresses an often-presumed link between awe and humility which bears on its moral status. (shrink)

The term ur-emotion is proposed to replace basic emotion as a name for the aspects of emotion that underlie perceived similarities of emotion types across cultures and species. The ur- prefix is borrowed from the German on analogy to similar borrowings in textual criticism and musicology. The proposed term ur-emotion is less likely to be interpreted as referring to the entirety of an emotional state than is the term basic emotion. Ur-emotion avoids reductionism by indicating an abstract underlying structure that (...) accounts for similarities between emotions without implying that the differences are unimportant. This article is dedicated to the memory of Bob Solomon, and is framed in terms of his decades-long analysis and critique of the concept of basic emotions. (shrink)

In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both Nietzsche’s critique of morality and what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-ranging critique of morality, including Mitleid. It is one of Nietzsche’s most experimental works and is best read, I claim, as (...) an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present and an exercise in moral therapy. In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social dimension of the text and its concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche’s Epicurean moment, followed by two sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of self. In the conclusion to the essay I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the essay seeks to make a contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy. (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been a renewed attention to the emotions amongst scientists of different disciplines: psychology, psychiatry, neurobiology, cognitive science, computer science, sociology, economics, and many others. There are many research centers and scientific journals devoted to affective states already existing. However, studies of emotion have a very long history - especially in philosophy. Philosophers first raised many important questions about emotions and their contribution to the discovery of the nature of emotions is very important. The aim of (...) the article is the reconstruction of the views on emotions of particular thinkers in history of philosophy. (shrink)

Strictly speaking, Aristotle did not formulate a theory of the emotions, but we find indications of one in several of his treatise. Many studies about his conception of the emotions lose sight of the fact that the Aristotelian analysis of the passions or emotions in every theoretical context respond..

The purpose of this article is to open a dialogue between research in social sciences concerning collective emotion and historical investigation concerning a religious and political movement of the...

Es ya un tópico, aquél que establece una relación entre la obra de Montaigne y la de Descartes, bien como adversarios, bien como precedente el uno del otro o como alternativas por relación al concepto de sujeto, que no llegaron a formular plenamente con sus características actuales. Sin embargo, al hilo del estudio del papel del cuerpo en ambos pensadores trataremos de mostrar, primero, su cercanía contextual y, luego, sus filiaciones conceptuales. Ambos autores están mucho más cerca de lo que (...) suele creerse y las deudas intelectuales de Descartes con Montaigne se resumen, además, en una noción de individuo realmente existente y una concepción de la “vida” como alternativa a la filosofía tradicional, que pueden ser de gran interés para el pensamiento actual. There is a cliché that establishes a relationship between the works of Montaigne and the writings of Descartes, either as adversaries, either as a precedent one of the other or as alternatives in relation to a concept that they did not fully draw up with its contemporary characteristics, that is, the subject. However, in connection with the study of the role of the body in both thinkers we will try to show first its contextual closeness and then its conceptual affiliations. Both authors are much closer to what we usually believe and the intellectual debts of Descartes to Montaigne are also summarized in a notion of an existing individual and a conception of “life” as an alternative to traditional philosophy, which can be of great interest for current thinkers. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

The notion of vulnerability is one of the most original theoretical underpinnings of Martha Nussbaum’s philosophical project. Inspired by Aristotle and by a reappraisal of Greek tragedy, the American philosopher recovers an important perspective for contemporary ethical and political reflection: our continuous exposure to unexpected, changing or contingent situations of fortune that can considerably affect our search for a good life, and altruistic emotions as a response to that essential fragility that shapes us. This article offers a reconstruction of the (...) idea of ​​a vulnerable moral agent as a key insight that allows Nussbaum to articulate a more pregnant conception of social justice, human dignity, and quality of life, incorporating intuitions about the nurturing and refinement of certain moral emotions which are relevant to counteract our all too frequent failure to see the “other different” as fully human. (shrink)