RESUMEN La interpretación habitual de Descartes sostiene que la nueva ciencia cartesiana es resultado del remplazo, en las explicaciones científicas, de las causas finales y formales por las causas eficientes. Si bien dicha afirmación en líneas generales es correcta, se ha tendido a asumir que las causas eficientes no entrañan problema alguno. Este artículo desea cuestionar dicha asunción, poniendo de manifiesto una serie de problemáticas concernientes a la cognoscibilidad de las causas eficientes. ABSTRACT The common interpretation of Descartes argues that (...) the new science is a result of Cartesian replacement, in scientific explanations, of the final and formal causes by the efficient causes. While this statement is broadly correct, it has tended to assume that efficient causes do not imply any problem. This paper wishes to question this assumption, showing a number of problems concerning the knowability of efficient causes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : On many accounts, Rule IV appears to be composed of two distinct texts, and this should be justified by the difference between the mathesis universalis and the Cartesian method. This article runs counter to the usual interpretation by showing that the discussion on mathematics in Rule IV has enabled the introduction of method constraining scientific research to operate on grounds of order and measurement. The mathesis universalis is not so much a science of higher mathematics as a universal (...) method by the means of which one can find truth. (shrink)