This paper explores the interrelations between temporality and emotion in rhetorical argumentation. It argues that in situations of uncertainty argumentation affects action via appeals that invoke emotion and thereby translate the distant past and future into the situated present. Using practical inferences, a threefold model for the interrelation of emotion and time in argumentation outlines how argumentative action depends on whether speakers provide reasons for the exigence that makes a decision necessary, the contingency of the decision, and the confidence required (...) to act. Experiences and choices from the past influence the emotions experienced in the present and inform two intertemporal mechanisms that allow speakers and audiences to take the leap of faith that defines decision-making under uncertainty: retrospective forecasting and prospective remembering. Retrospective forecasting establishes a past–future–present link, whereas prospective remembering establishes a future-past-present link, and, together, the two mechanisms provide a situated presence that transcends the temporal constraints of uncertainty. Finally, the applicability of the model is illustrated through an analysis of a speech delivered by Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a time where the need for decisive, yet argumentative action was crucial. (shrink)

Martin Luther King, Jr.’s anti-war speech, “Beyond Vietnam,” is a noteworthy example of deliberation by dissent from the margins. Attention is given to the formation of his moral argument from similitude, its foundation in metaphor and archetypal imagery, and how it shifted perspective to enable the introduction of alternative lines of argument. King’s argumentation, as it worked rhetorically toward making the war debatable, exhibited key features of deliberative dissent, including catachresis, contingency, perspective, and incommensurability.

In this study, we consider the ways different degrees of dissent are established in interaction, especially in interactions among children. One important aspect in the development of the ability to argue is the framing of interactions as rather cooperative or agonistic. Different framings seem to allow for different forms of argumentative activity. The focus in this paper is on the mediation of degrees of dissensus in argumentation in child-child communication. It is established, we argue, through verbal as well as non-verbal (...) means, and the agonistic and cooperativity can be indicators for the space argumentation has in child-child interaction. (shrink)

Muchos problemas deliberativos son multidimensionales: los argumentos a favor y en contra de las soluciones propuestas apelan a valores que pertenecen a distintas dimensiones. Así, por ejemplo, los argumentos a favor de la propuesta de negociar para resolver el problema de un conflicto armado interno pueden apelar a la paz mientras que los argumentos en contra pueden apelar a la justicia. Esto hace posible que los interlocutores acepten las premisas de un argumento sin comprometerse con su conclusión y que lo (...) justifiquen haciendo énfasis en las premisas del argumento contrario – “sí, una negociación reduciría el número de los muertos por violencia política, pero generaría impunidad, así que no debemos negociar”-. Si esta situación fuera insuperable, los argumentos en la deliberación nunca podrían ser válidos, nunca podrían ser tales que la aceptación de las premisas comprometiera a quien las acepta con las conclusiones. En este artículo considero algunas respuestas a este problema: las respuestas de C. Kock, T. Govier, P. Olmos y la respuesta de F. Macagno y D. Walton; señalo algunos problemas que encuentro en estas respuestas e intento resolverlos distinguiendo los casos en que es posible de los casos en los que no es posible superar el problema de la multidimensionalidad en la deliberación. (shrink)

Philosophers deny a proposal for actions can be deduced from arguments for or against the proposal because they may be incompatible. Nevertheless, people in general, and politicians especially, make decisions and present arguments they believe are convincing. We studied politicians who made decisions in complex situations. They spoke about possible actions, their consequences, the probabilities of these consequences and their evaluations, but rarely indicated why their arguments led to their choice. We hypothesized implicit argumentation rules involved and checked whether they (...) predicted those choices. We found seven implicit informal logic rules involved. We also found a random sample of people made the same choices based on the same arguments, suggesting basic warrants by which people argue about decisions. (shrink)

This paper looks at how the "balance" between lives, livelihoods and other concerns was talked about in four main newspapers in the UK, between March 2020 and March 2021, in assessing the UK government's performance. Different arguments were made for opposite conclusions, favouring either strict and prolonged lockdowns or, on the contrary, a speedy exit from lockdown and a resumption of normal life. From the point of view of argumentation theory, the empirical data suggests that what is being balanced or (...) weighed together in pro/con argumentation by two opposite parties are not as much the costs and benefits of one's own proposal, but the costs of one proposal against the costs of its alternative (a "cost-cost", rather than a "cost-benefit" analysis). Rather than defending their own proposal by arguing that the benefits outweigh the costs, each side is criticizing the opponent's proposal by claiming that the costs of their proposal are more unacceptable than the costs of their own. The "best" decision in choosing among two proposals with negative consequences is the one that avoids the proposal with the worse overall consequences (and thus minimizes the maximum possible loss). This implicit minimax strategy was applied in radically different ways, depending on how the consequences were assessed by various parties to the debate (including the government), which consequences were considered less unacceptable (or became less unacceptable as the situation evolved). Different lines of action were defended in light of their ability to avoid unacceptable costs (negative consequences), i.e. their ability to withstand criticism in light of their potential costs. The debate over lockdown illustrated an interesting type of pro/con argument, in which all the intended "benefits" were in fact avoided "costs". It also placed in clear contrast a medical/epidemiological and a political perspective on the best course of action, stressing a government's obligation to balance together a much wider range of responsibilities and concerns. (shrink)

This essay addresses the collapse/incoherence problem for normative frameworks that contain both fundamental values and rules for promoting those values. The problem is that in some cases, we would bring about more of the fundamental value by violating the framework’s rules than by following them. In such cases, if the framework requires us to follow the rules anyway, then it appears to be incoherent; but if it allows us to make exceptions to the rules, then the framework “collapses” into one (...) that doesn’t make use of rules in the first place. The chapter begins with an examination of happiness and truth as fundamental values in Mill’s work, which lead into parallel versions of the collapse/incoherence problem in ethics and epistemology. It then sets out the collapse problem for rule-consequentialist approaches in ethics, truth-directed accounts of justification in epistemology, and epistemological approaches to argument cogency. The chapter closes with discussion of two potential solutions to the problem. (shrink)

The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) reasons, for deductive arguments, e.g., semantic tableaux are suggested. (shrink)