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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Maintaining Organization in a Dynamic Long‐Term Memory
Cognitive Science 7 (4):243-280 (1983)
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Much of traditional AI exemplifies the explicit representation paradigm, and during the late 1980''s a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning explicit and implicit representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, (...) |
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This thesis is intended to analyze a mental phenomenon widely neglected in current philosophical discussions: personal memories. The first part presents a general framework to better understand what personal memories are, how we access our personal past and what we access about our personal past. Chapter 1 introduces traditional theories of memory: direct realism and representationalism in their different versions, as well as some objections. I defend here a particular form of representationalism that is based on the distinction between content, (...) |
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This paper begins with a discussion of two features of the everyday task environment. First, the everyday task environment is designed, and an important part of the design is the provision of explicit information to guide the individual in the adaptation of his activity. Second, some task environments are semi‐permanent. These two features of the task environment reveal some important characteristics in the psychology of the individual. When novelty occurs, expansion in the range of behavior of the individual is guided (...) |
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Reasoners compare problems to prior cases to draw conclusions about a problem and guide decision making. All Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) employs some methods for generalizing from cases to support indexing and relevance assessment and evidences two basic inference methods: constraining search by tracing a solution from a past case or evaluating a case by comparing it to past cases. Across domains and tasks, however, humans reason with cases in subtly different ways evidencing different mixes of and mechanisms for these components.In (...) |
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This study was aimed at explaining how and under what conditions surface similarity leads to the retrieval of an analogous base problem in LTM. Some elements of a theory of the organisation of knowledge in memory are proposed. Two levels of representation are distinguished. The first level represents directly accessible, local surface properties. The second level represents more abstract information pertaining to the category with which each analogous problem can be associated. Some results will be described showing that access to (...) |
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The BankXX system models the process of perusing and gathering information for argument as a heuristic best-first search for relevant cases, theories, and other domain-specific information. As BankXX searches its heterogeneous and highly interconnected network of domain knowledge, information is incrementally analyzed and amalgamated into a dozen desirable ingredients for argument (called argument pieces), such as citations to cases, applications of legal theories, and references to prototypical factual scenarios. At the conclusion of the search, BankXX outputs the set of argument (...) |
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The acquisition of expertise in formal problem solving has been assumed to involve either a shift from backwards to forwards inference, or a shift from unguided to guided forwards inference. In a longitudinal study, the acquisition of formal problem-solving expertise was investigated. Participants were tested as novices before undertaking controlled practice in the problem domain which involved transformation rule problems , and were finally tested as experts. The direction of inference in problem solutions was found to be inadequate to describe (...) |
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This research presents a computer model called EUREKA that begins with novice‐like strategies and knowledge organizations for solving physics word problems and acquires features of knowledge organizations and basic approaches that characterize experts in this domain. EUREKA learns a highly interrelated network of problem‐type schemas with associated solution methodologies. Initially, superficial features of the problem statement form the basis for both the problem‐type schemas and the discriminating features that organize them in the P‐MOP (Problem Memory Organization Packet) network. As EUREKA (...) |
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Adaptive Planning is an approach to planning in the commonsense domain. An adaptive planner takes advantage of the habitual nature of many of the planning situations for which it plans by bosing its activities on a memory of pre‐stored plans. A critical issue, and the subject of this paper, is the question of flexibility: How does an adaptive planner refit an old plan in order to meet the demands of some new planning situation? An adaptive planner refits prestored plans by (...) |
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