Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. By moral (...) emotions I mean emotions like indignation that reflect an agent’s ethical commitments and bear on her ethical assessments. Further, I argue that victims can impart their partial understanding of the wrong they suffer to others who are not similarly situated by eliciting moral emotions such as pity that are tied to broad notions of justice and fairness. (shrink)

In order to stress their Socratic inheritance, the Stoics, in their writings - dialogues, collections of maxims or « memorabilia » –, either drew upon the ancient Socratic literature or quoted Socratic sayings in their own moral treatises. Their authorities were not only Xenophon and Plato’s dialogues, but the works of Antisthenes and Aeschines of Sphettos, minor trends in ancient Socratic literature, such as Phaedo or Simon, and part of the later Socratic literature, in particular Diogenes of Sinope and Crates (...) fof Thebes. (shrink)