According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative (...) counting requires the relativization either of quantifiers, or of identity, or of the is one of relation. However, some of these relativizations do not deliver the expected results, and others rely on problematic assumptions. In another broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about concepts or sets. The most promising development of this approach is prima facie connected with a violation of the so-called Coreferentiality Constraint, according to which an identity statement is true only if its terms have the same referent. Moreover - even provided that the problem with coreferentiality can be fixed - the resulting analysis of cardinality ascriptions meets several difficulties. (shrink)

Speaking of dental floss contaminated with bacteria, I may separate the dental floss that is sterile from the dental floss that isn’t sterile. The definite description “the dental floss that isn’t sterile” contracts its reference to just the dental floss near bacteria, although it, the dental floss whole, isn’t sterile. To accommodate the definite descriptions that contract their reference, received definitions for ⌜the Φ⌝ are amended from to read as in : ⌜the Φ⌝ refers to that which any Φ is (...) part of and is the least such. ⌜the Φ⌝ refers to that which any Φ overlaps and is the least such. If definite description is to be based on a purely logical notion of plural and mass predication, it is further amended. Like overt demonstratives—⌜this/these Φ⌝, ⌜that/those Φ⌝—any definite description in natural language is also perspectival, scanning everywhere the description Φ is satisfied:⌜the Φ⌝ refers to the least Φ that overlap Φ anywhere there is Φ. (shrink)

Composition as identity is the view that a whole is identical to its parts taken collectively. Such a view raises the question of how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things. A primitivist view holds that there is no explanation to be had and that we simply need to accept that being one thing and being many things are compatible. One might think that we can do better by resorting to relativization. A relativist view (...) may seem to explain how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things on the basis of the assumption that the portion of reality is these ways relative to different ‘concepts’ or ‘counts’. This paper discusses whether relativization truly leads to a satisfactory explanation of how something can be both one thing and many things. The conclusion will be that, when we consider the current accounts of the involved parameters, these relativizations make no explanatory progress. (shrink)

Hofweber (Ontology and the ambitions of metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2016) argues for a thesis he calls “internalism” with respect to natural number discourse: no expressions purporting to refer to natural numbers in fact refer, and no apparent quantification over natural numbers actually involves quantification over natural numbers as objects. He argues that while internalism leaves open the question of whether other kinds of abstracta exist, it precludes the existence of natural numbers, thus establishing what he calls “restricted nominalism” about (...) natural numbers. We argue that Hofweber’s internalism fails to establish restricted nominalism. Not only is his primary argument for restricted nominalism invalid, the analysis of quantification proposed threatens to collapse internalism into either a traditional form of error theory or realism. (shrink)

The paper gives a historically informed reconstruction of Frege's view of statements of number. The reconstruction supports Frege's claim that a statement can be 'about a concept' although it does not contain a singular term referring to the concept. Hence, Frege's philosophy of number is not subject to the problems Frege sees for singular reference to concepts.

El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan advertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido un (...) enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el “texto de la adoración.”. (shrink)

Central to What Babies Know (Spelke, 2022) is the thesis that infants' understanding is divided into independent modules of core knowledge. As a test case, we consider adding a new domain: core knowledge of substances. Experiments show that infants' understanding of substances meets some criteria of core knowledge, and they raise questions about the relations that hold between core domains.