This paper investigates the value of trust and the proper attitude lay people ought to have towards scientific experts. Trust in expertise is usually considered to be valuable, while distrust is often analyzed in cases where it is harmful. I will draw on accounts from political philosophy and argue that it is not only public trust that is valuable when it comes to scientific expertise – but also public vigilance. Expertise may be distorted in different ways, which cannot be remedied (...) by internal control mechanisms alone. This reveals the importance of some forms of democratic oversight. The proper attitude is vigilant trust in expertise. However, vigilant trust seems to be a contradictory notion: How can one be trusting and watchful at the same time? I will show that it is not, and that trust and vigilance can be compatible to a certain extent. I will do so by distinguishing between different levels of both trust and vigilance. Interestingly, this argument requires acknowledging the value of some forms of distrust in scientific expertise, even if that distrust targets trustworthy experts. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss and develop the risk account of scientific objectivity, which I have recently introduced, contrasting it to some alternatives. I then use the account in order to analyse a practice that is relatively common in anthropology, in the history of science, and in the sociology of scientific knowledge: withholding epistemic judgement. I argue that withholding epistemic judgement on the beliefs one is studying can be a relatively efficient strategy against collective bias in these fields. However, taking (...) into account the criticisms presented against the strategy, I also argue that it is a usable strategy only when the distance between the researchers and their ideas, and the people and ideas being studied, is significant enough. (shrink)