Many academics and researchers who publish scholarly articles on Plato’s philosophy of education claim that the ultimate educational goal for Plato is simply the acquisition of virtues. While such a claim may not be entirely incorrect, it is nevertheless substantially wanting; for although the acquisition of virtue is no doubt paramount, for Plato it primarily serves as a means to another end. In this paper, I aim to show that, for Plato, the final summit of all educational enterprise is not (...) really to become virtuous but rather to attain the state of becoming like God, and that is, homoiōsis theōi. -/- . (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to argue that Socrates is an intellectual character builder. We show that the Socratic Method, properly understood, is a tool for developing the intellectual character of students. It motivates agents towards the truth and helps them to develop the cognitive skills to gain knowledge of the truth. We further elucidate this proposal by comparing the Socratic Method, so understood, with the widely held contemporary view that the epistemic aim of education is the development of (...) the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

Building on Jonas and Nakazawa’s recent work (A Platonic Theory of Moral Education), my aim in this paper is to address two widespread misunderstandings of Plato’s ideas about education. The first is that the Platonic theory of education is nonegalitarian, promoting an educational system that justifies and perpetuates a caste-based society. The second is that the Platonic conception of the virtuous agent is primitive and far inferior to the Aristotelian conception, especially concerning the psychological make-up of the virtuous agent. By (...) exploring some of the ways these misreadings can be countered, I defend the value of the Platonic educational theory for contemporary education and show the value of Jonas and Nakazawa’s project. (shrink)

Despite the recent growth of studies in virtue epistemology, the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness has been overlooked by scholars working in virtue theory. This is a significant gap in the literature given the import of well-motivated and skillful epistemic collaboration for the flourishing of human societies. This paper engages in an in-depth examination of the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness. It argues that the agent who possesses this acquired character trait is (i) highly motivated to engage in epistemic collaboration (...) (out of her rational desire for intellectual ends), (ii) competent at the characteristic activity of epistemic collaborativeness and (iii) has good judgement as to when and with whom it is epistemically appropriate to engage in epistemic collaboration. Furthermore, this paper discusses the place of epistemic collaborativeness among the virtues and argues that it is an overarching virtue—i.e. it presupposes certain other intellectual virtues although it remains distinguishable from them. Theoretical and practical merits of this virtue are also presented and considered. The virtue of collaborativeness highlights the social dimension of intellectual virtues and could be of significant value for contemporary virtue-based approaches to education. (shrink)

In A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa have argued that Plato outlines a theory of virtue education. Alkis Kotsonis has similarly argued that Plato articulated a theory of intellectual character education. I think that Jonas, Nakazawa, and Kotsonis have opened a productive line of enquiry on this matter, and I expand on their work in this paper by identifying connections between Plato’s work and the contemporary discourse on character education, which features four domains of virtues: (...) moral, intellectual, civic, and performance virtues. Plato’s treatment of virtue, I argue, not only can be mapped onto the contemporary treatment of character education but it also further demonstrates that cultivating virtue—the project of character education—was a paramount concern for Plato. (shrink)

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that considers many different facets of education – i.e. moral character education, intellectual character education, exemplarism and educational corruption. (...) Given Plato’s immense contribution to virtue education theory, I conclude that his educational program merits more attention. It can serve as inspiration both for improving existing theories of character education and for developing new ones. (shrink)