This article presents a detailed analysis of how the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687) adapted the philosophy of the German mystic Jacob Böhme (1575–1624). For More, Böhme’s errors can be amended only by intervening radically in his philosophical system, discussing not what Böhme said, but what he should have said. In particular, the essay studies how and why More, in Censura, altered a scheme used by Böhme in his Clavis to explain visually the core of his philosophical insight. It claims (...) that this intervention, which consists mainly in moving the position of the Sun in the scheme, turns Böhme’s circular metaphysical system, in which the Sun, or fire, was the fulcrum of a perpetual movement, into a Neoplatonic system of emanation. In so doing, More fashions himself as a “Böhme redivivus”, showing to his readers that the only way of making sense of Böhme is to read him in Neoplatonic terms. The removal of the Sun from its original place in the scheme thus exemplifies More’s unease with Böhme’s conception of the Sun as fully embedded in the dynamic interplay of light and darkness, and shows that More’s interpretation of Böhme involves a full operation of rewriting. (shrink)

Dès sa constitution comme domaine du savoir à la fin du XVIe siècle, la psychologie se divise rapidement en deux tendances d’orientation différente. La première, d’inspiration naturaliste, se situe dans le prolongement du commentaire de la Physica aristotélicienne et se développe principalement dans les universités protestantes de Marburg et de Leyde. Dans ces établissements où règne alors un esprit humaniste, rationaliste et tolérant, se met en place la première forme du dualisme de l’âme et du corps. Mais à la même (...) époque, dans des cercles mystiques et hermétistes, se développe une autre conception de la psychologie dont la méthode interprétative s’inspire de l’exégèse biblique et met en oeuvre des procédés thérapeutiques, cure d’âme et cure magnétique, qui reposent sur l’influence psychologique. (shrink)

In inter-war France, history of philosophy was a very important academic discipline, but nevertheless its practitioners thought it necessary to defend its identity, which was threatened by its vicinity to many other disciplines, and especially by the emergent social sciences and history of science. I shall focus on two particular issues that divided traditional historians of philosophy from historians of science, ethnologists and sociologists, and that became crucial in the definition of the identity of their disciplines: the conception of history (...) and the interpretation of texts. By analysing representative discussions and positions, I shall show that traditional historians of philosophy needed to reassert their own approach to history, which, borrowing the term from Bergson, I define as ‘snapshot’. This approach is focused on a particular idea or text rather than a narrative. I shall also show that history of philosophy, in its traditional form, would have been undermined both intellectually and institutionally by the opposite ‘narrative’ approach of history of science and of the social sciences. Social scientists openly attacked history of philosophy’s methods and, in the eyes of traditional philosophers, its existence as an academic discipline. The same opposition is to be found in evaluation of past texts, which for traditional historians of philosophy were to be read as timeless documents, while for historians of science, ethnologists and sociologists were to be considered as documents exhibiting a particular mentality. However, between these alternatives there were intermediate positions. I shall in particular consider that of Léon Brunschvicg: he embraced a narrative approach and considered texts as documents of different ways of thinking, but at the same time carried on employing philosophical methods and defending the institutional position of philosophy. I shall argue that this was possible partly because of the considerable amount of power he enjoyed at the Sorbonne. (shrink)