As a policy instrument that is deeply rooted in technology assessment, the precautionary principle examines the effects of a given object on humans and the environment. In practice the principle is rarely used to analyze the effects of our safety measures on the object itself or the way it is produced. Yet it is exactly in the effect on the blood procurement system that blood safety regulations based on the precautionary principle have to be particularly careful, as the vast majority (...) of blood products in the Global North are obtained through donations. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle is explicated with the (...) help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that zoonotic diseases are a great threat for humanity. During the course of such a pandemic, public health authorities often apply the precautionary principle to justify disease control measures. However, evoking this principle is not without ethical implications. Especially within a One Health strategy, that requires us to balance public health benefits against the health interests of animals and the environment, unrestricted use of the precautionary principle can lead to moral dilemmas. In this article, we (...) analyze the ethical dimensions of the use of the precautionary principle in zoonotic disease control and formulate criteria to protect animals and the environment against one-sided interpretations. Furthermore, we distinguish two possible conceptions of the precautionary principle. First, we notice that because of the unpredictable nature of zoonotic diseases, public health authorities in general focus on the idea of precaution as preparedness. This reactive response often leads to difficult trade-offs between human and animal health. We therefore argue that this policy should always be accompanied by a second policy, that we refer to as precaution as prevention. Although zoonotic diseases are part of our natural world, we have to acknowledge that their origin and global impact are often a consequence of our disturbed relation with animals and the environment. (shrink)

Anthropocentrism—the idea that humans are the most important beings there are—comes in many guises. One version of anthropocentrism states that only humans have full moral status. Those who argue for such a position (beyond merely assuming it) usually refer to some trait that confers moral status and that only humans have. Suggestions include linguistic ability, self-awareness or rationality. However, regardless of what trait one picks it will not track the line between Homo sapiens and other species. You will always be (...) able to find some non-human animal that possesses the trait to a greater degree than some human does— even potentially. Koplin and Wilkinson1 adopt a broadly sentientist position: moral status is conferred by some mental or cognitive function. They discuss two sources of moral uncertainty related to this. In cases of moral uncertainty of the first type, it is uncertain whether Property X confers (full) moral status. In cases of uncertainty of the second type, we assume it to be true that moral status is conferred by X, but it is uncertain whether a particular entity (such as a pig) possesses the property. There are reasons to believe …. (shrink)