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Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine's Charter for Christian Philosophy'

In Thomas P. Flint (ed.), Christian Philosophy. Univ Notre Dame Pr. pp. 1--36 (1990)

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  1. Evidentialism versus faith.John Zeis - 2010 - Social Epistemology 24 (1):1 – 13.
    In his Epistula , Saint Augustine seems to suggest an epistemic position that is antithetical to an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. However, I think it can be shown that even if evidentialism is taken to be the preferred method of epistemic justification, an epistemic position that incorporates a faith which is grounded in the truth and produces knowledge is epistemologically justified. Evidentialist objections to such a faith-grounded position founder on principles that even the staunchest defenders of an evidentialist theory (...)
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  • How can one search for God?: The paradox of inquiry in Augustine's confessions.Scott Macdonald - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):20–38.
    The Confessions recounts Augustine 's successful search for God. But Augustine worries that one cannot search for God if one does not already know God. That version of the paradox of inquiry dominates and structures Confessions 1–10. I draw connections between the dramatic opening lines of book 1 and the climactic discussion in book 10.26–38 and argue that the latter discussion contains Augustine 's resolution of the paradox of inquiry as it applies to the special case of searching for God. (...)
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  • Holding the Faith True.John Zeis - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):161-170.
    In this paper, I argue that the objections to both doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism fail. Objections to doxastic volitionism and doxastic voluntarism assume a generic notion of belief, a notion which covers both beliefs about things which we know or think we know or are evident to us, as well as beliefs which have some degree of credence but are not clearly evident to the subject. The generic notion of belief includes both sorts of beliefs, but the position against (...)
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