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Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental

In Sandra Lapointe & Christopher Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 197-228 (2017)

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  1. Brentano's "Descriptive" Realism.Denis Seron - 2014 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 10:1-14.
    Brentano’s metaphysical position in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that time, as well as later, a full-fledged phenomenalist. However, his phenomenalism is markedly different from standard phenomenalism in that it does not deny that the physicist’s judgments are really about the objective world. The aim of the theory of intentionality, I argue, is to allow for extra-phenomenal aboutness within a phenomenalist framework.
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  • Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In Brentano’s Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano’s work forms a “live philosophical program” (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano’s notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano’s rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano’s notion of intentionality is (...)
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  • Overcoming the Past-Endorsement Criterion: Toward a Transparency-Based Mark of the Mental.Giulia Piredda & Michele Di Francesco - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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