Physicists were asked the question, “What do you think are the most important qualities needed to be successful at the type of work you do?” The results demonstrate which qualities physicists value and how values vary among the qualities they identified. The results also show how physicists’ beliefs about success vary by the rank of their department, age, productivity, and gender. More generally, the findings cast light on the moral order of physics by eliciting how members of an occupation construe (...) the structure of success in their line of work. (shrink)

Complexity in our universe, Herbert Simon once noted, generally takes a hierarchical, nearly decomposable form. If our purpose as biologists is to "carve Nature at the joints," then the quantitative biologist's pattern questions must embody some tentative claim of where the explanatory joints are—only after meaningful qualifications can notions of variance and covariance make sense. In morphometrics, specimens and variables alike can be "carved at the joints," with a correspondingly great gain in explanatory power in both versions. Simon's advice is (...) that the competent biologist's measurements should lie entirely within a single organismal component or else deal entirely with one of the joints. In either context, our best contemporary rhetorics of explanation in biology may resemble morphometrics in their frank combination of carefully supervised parallel quantifications that, taken together, result in new qualifications, leading in turn to new quantifications, and so on. In short, the relation between qualitative and quantitative in the organismal biological sciences is not an opposition but a complementarity, and the modern biometrical statistics of organismal form may be a particularly apposite praxis for exploring it. (shrink)

Mathematical theorems are cultural artifacts and may be interpreted much as works of art, literature, and tool-and-craft are interpreted. The Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, the Central Limit Theorem of Statistics, and the Statistical Continuum Limit of field theories, all show how the world may be put together through the arithmetic addition of suitably prescribed parts (velocities, variances, and renormalizations and scaled blocks, respectively). In the limit — of smoothness, statistical independence, and large N — higher-order parts, such as accelerations, (...) are, for the most, part irrelevant, affirming that, in the end, most of the world's particulars may be averaged over (a very un-Scriptural point of view). (We work out all of this in technical detail, including a nice geometric picture of stochastic integration, and a method of calculating the variance of the sum of dependent random variables using renormalization group ideas.) These fundamental theorems affirm a culture that is additive, ahistorical, Cartesian, and continuist, sharing in what might be called a species of modern culture. We understand mathematical results as useful because, like many other such artifacts, they have been adapted to fit the world, and the world has been adapted to fit their capacities. Such cultural interpretation is in effect motivation for the mathematics, and might well be offered to students as a way of helping them understand what is going on at the blackboard. Philosophy of mathematics might want to pay more attention to the history and detailed technical features of sophisticated mathematics, as a balance to the usual concerns that arise in formalist or even Platonist positions. (shrink)

The ArgumentMost lay users of statistics think in terms of means (averages), variances or the square of the standard deviation, and Gaussians or bell-shaped curves. Such conventions are entrenched by statistical practice, by deep mathematical theorems from probability, and by theorizing in the various natural and social sciences. I am not claiming that the particular conventions (here, the statistics) we adopt are arbitrary. Entrenchment can be rational without its being as well categorical (excluding all other alternatives), even if that entrenchment (...) claims also to provide for categoricity. 1 provide a detailed description of how a science is “normal” and conventionalized. A characteristic feature of this entrenchment of conventions by practice, theorems, and theorizing, is its highly technical form, the canonizing work enabled by apparently formal and esoteric mathematical means. (shrink)

Although Harry Woolf’s great collective volume Quantification mostly overlooked biology, Thomas Kuhn’s chapter there on the role of quantitative measurement within the physical sciences maps quite well onto the forms of reasoning that actually persuade us as biologists 50 years later. Kuhn distinguished between two contexts, that of producing quantitative anomalies and that of resolving them. The implied form of reasoning is actually C. S. Peirce’s abduction or inference to the best explanation: “The surprising fact C is observed; but if (...) A were true, C would be a matter of course; hence there is reason to suspect that A is true.” This article reviews abduction and the Kuhnian dichotomy in a range of classic examples where quantitative reasoning has ended arguments in the natural sciences. Included are John Snow’s discovery of the cause of cholera, Jean Perrin’s proof that atoms exist, the discovery of the double helix, the Alvarezes’ explanation of the extraterrestrial origin of the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction, and current examples in passive smoking, ulcers, and the anthropogenicity of global warming. Modern biology is a quantitative science to the extent that we operate by “strong inference,” the insistence that our data are surprising on everybody else’s hypotheses but follow as a matter of course from our own, and that we demand numerical consilience whenever we infer across levels of analysis or across disciplines. (shrink)