The 'enhancement agenda' in educational policy is based on the idea that 'something affective', which supports and improves learning, can be a) measured and b) enhanced. This idea is explored, and it is argued that the identity of the 'something' that the enhancement agenda seeks to enhance is fatally obscure, as is the idea of measurable enhancement. Interpreted in Aristotelian terms as the desire to cultivate certain emotional dispositions, the idea of 'prevailing' on children morally makes good sense. Unlike the (...) enhancement agenda, however, the Aristotelian project is informal, intimate and bound to the notion of human flourishing. The paper concludes with an enquiry into the central concerns that drive the enhancement debate, and an answer is sketched in terms of excessive fear and shame, and the circular logic of failure. This answer, it is argued, elucidates an 'ordinary' concept of low self-esteem that is a potential 'barrier to learning', and should therefore be taken seriously by educators. (shrink)

The ‘enhancement agenda’ in educational policy is based on the idea that ‘something affective’, which supports and improves learning, can be a) measured and b) enhanced. This idea is explored, and it is argued that the identity of the ‘something’ that the enhancement agenda seeks to enhance is fatally obscure, as is the idea of measurable enhancement. Interpreted in Aristotelian terms as the desire to cultivate certain emotional dispositions, the idea of ‘prevailing’ on children morally makes good sense. Unlike the (...) enhancement agenda, however, the Aristotelian project is informal, intimate and bound to the notion of human flourishing. The paper concludes with an enquiry into the central concerns that drive the enhancement debate, and an answer is sketched in terms of excessive fear and shame, and the circular logic of failure. This answer, it is argued, elucidates an ‘ordinary’ concept of low self-esteem that is a potential ‘barrier to learning’, and should therefore be taken seriously by educators. (shrink)

The article aims to provide a justification for the claim that optimal development and becoming an optimiser are educational ideals that parents should pursue in raising their children. Optimal development is conceptualised as enabling children to grow into flourishing persons, that is persons who have developed their given possibilities to the full and optimally fulfil the domains that can be said to be objectively good for all people. This also comprises the development of children into persons who want to become (...) optimisers and pursue excellent aims in life, i.e. who pursue ideals. Optimal development is not only an ideal, it requires ideals too. With excellent examples of the objective goods that are good for all people, children are given examples of what it means to strive for the best and are thereby enabled to develop themselves to the full. Two main points of critique, namely that it leads to elitism and to neurotic perfectionism are discussed and rebutted. This leads to a defence of a form of realistic perfectionism. The article ends with a description of the way in which parents could aspire towards the ideal aim of realistic perfectionism. (shrink)

Self‐esteem is traditionally regarded as an important human good. But it has suffered a number of injuries to its good name. Critics allege that endeavours to promote self‐esteem merely foster narcissism or entitlement, and urge that we redirect our efforts elsewhere. I argue that such criticisms are symptomatic of a normative decline in how we think and theorize about self‐esteem rather than a defect in the construct itself. After exposing the shortcomings of alternative proposals, I develop an account of self‐esteem (...) that reflects what its supporters have in mind: a valuable form of self‐appraisal worth fostering in others and ourselves. (shrink)

Some philosophers of education have recently argued that educators can more or less ignore children's global self-esteem without failing them educationally in any important way. This paper draws on an attachment theoretic account of self-esteem to argue that this view is mistaken. I argue that understanding self-esteem's origins in attachment supports two controversial claims. First, self-esteem is a crucial element of the confidence and motivation children need in order to engage in and achieve educational pursuits, especially in certain domains of (...) instruction such as physical education. Second, self-esteem can be facilitated socially, through an appropriate arrangement of school institutions, thus without hindering the pursuit of other high priority aims such as a challenging academic curriculum. Consequently I maintain that educators who ignore self-esteem overlook something educationally important. (shrink)

Some philosophers of education have recently argued that educators can more or less ignore children’s global self-esteem without failing them educationally in any important way. This paper draws on an attachment theoretic account of self-esteem to argue that this view is mistaken. I argue that understanding self-esteem’s origins in attachment supports two controversial claims. First, self-esteem is a crucial element of the confidence and motivation children need in order to engage in and achieve educational pursuits, especially in certain domains of (...) instruction such as physical education. Second, self-esteem can be facilitated socially, through an appropriate arrangement of school institutions, thus without hindering the pursuit of other high priority aims such as a challenging academic curriculum. Consequently I maintain that educators who ignore self-esteem overlook something educationally important. (shrink)