Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the (...) quantum potential in the de Broglie–Bohm theory. This model can be applied to analyze cognitive information processing in psychological experiments. It is shown that the quantum potential shares several features with Duns Scotus’ notion of contingent causality. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the essential tenets of the Southwestern Neo-Kantians? take on the philosophy of religion. Specifically, I concentrate on two diverse aspects of Windelband and Rickert?s approaches to religion. In the first place, I look at the way in which they determine religious values. In the second place, I focus on the manner in which they confront religion with the systematic structure of culture. As a result of the analysis of the texts of both authors, we see that (...) it is possible to detect at least three possible roads to elaborate a philosophy of religion. In spite of this plurality of paths, I argue that they exhibit a similar underlying problem, namely, the problematic relationship between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. It is for this reason that the philosophy of religion takes the form of a reflection on the limits of knowledge, and with it, on the limits of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I present Heinrich Rickert’s account of the difference between theoretical and ethical values as an insightful strategy to accommodate constructivist and realistic intuitions in metae...

The meaning and validity of Kant’s Kant’s doctrine of schematism remains contested until today. In neo-Kantianism and post-War transcendental philosophy, Kant’s schematism of the pure concepts of understanding is transformed drastically. Kant’s thesis of heterogeneity is overcome by taking it back into the internal relationships of the structure of cognition. The spontaneity of thought, performing schematizations, is retained, but Kant’s project of conceiving of the foundations of knowledge in the fashion of a theory of apperception of the I as well (...) as the externality of the given and the determination of the given that goes along with it is sublated by an objective order of validity-noematic constitution and regulation. Kant’s doctrine of schematism, then, shows to be methodology. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Dans cet article, j’entreprends de clarifier le projet (frégéen) d’une logique de l’arithmétique -- tel qu’il a été discuté par Natorp et Rickert -- en distinguant trois questions directrices. Le nombre est-il un objet logique? L’arithmétique est-elle réductible à la logique? Est-il possible de déduire les opérations arithmétiques de lois purement logiques? Ma thèse est que la distinction rigoureuse de ces trois questions permet de lever une grande partie des obscurités qui affectent en généralle programme d’une logique de l’arithmétique. (...) La contribution néo-kantienne à ce programme se trouve du même coup éclairée d’une lumière nouvelle.ABSTRACT: In this article, I try to shed light on the (Fregean) project of a logic of arithmelic-as discussed by Natorp and Rickert-by outlining three main questions. Is the number a logical object? Is arithmetic reducible to logic? Is it possible to deduce the arithmetical operations from purely logical laws? I argue that rigorous distinction between these three questions makes it possible to elucidate many problems affecting the program of a logic of arithmetic. The Neo-Kantian contribution to this program is at the same time considered in a new light. (shrink)