Natural-kind essentialism faces an important but neglected difficulty: the problem of complex essences (PCE). This is the question of how to account for the unity of an instantiated kind-essence when that essence consists of multiple distinct properties, some of which lack an inherent necessary connection between them. My central goal here is to propose an essentialism-friendly solution to this problem. Along the way I also employ some points from that solution to argue for the necessary truth of essentialism (necessary, that (...) is, in all possible worlds in which there are material objects), and to support the essentialist ontology of laws over and against a major rival. (shrink)

In this paper I present Suárez’s conception on material substance in connection with two main aspects of his theory. The first aspect is “reification” of the intrinsic principles of a composite, which has led some interpreters to the claim that Suárez significantly prepared the way for the accession of Cartesian anthropological dualism. The second one is Suárez’s emphasis on the substantial unity of material composites. The analysis of the second aspect is conceived as a counterbalance to some uncharitable interpretations of (...) Suárez’s hylemorphism. In the second part of the paper the relevance of Suárez’s arguments to contemporary debates on the ontological constitution of individuals is presented. (shrink)

Marc Lange and Ann Whittle have independently developed an important challenge to dispositionalism, arguing that dispositions are reducible to primitive subjunctive facts. I argue in reply that by pairing dispositionalism with a certain version of natural-kind essentialism, their objection can be overcome. Moreover, such a marriage carries further advantages for the dispositionalist. My aim is therefore two-fold: to defend dispositionalism, and to give the dispositionalist some new motivation to adopt natural-kind essentialism.

Essentie en accident zijn begrippen waarmee filosofen van oude tijden af tot op de dag van vandaag zich bezig hebben gehouden. Essentie kan omschreven worden als datgene waarom een ding is wat het is. Het is een equivalent van wat Aristoteles noemt to ti einai. De essentie is dus de radicale grond van de vele eigenschappen van een ding waarnaar de eigenschappen noodzakelijk verwijzen. Essentie wordt dan ook wel gezien als de abstracte pendant van een concrete entiteit. De laatste betekent (...) wat iets actueel is of kan zijn , terwijl de eerste verwijst naar de grond waarom iets precies is wat het is. De vraag naar de essentie is dus de vraag naar het wat van een ding: wat is een boom?, wat is een mens? enz. (shrink)