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Explaining our Choices: Reid on Motives, Character and Effort

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):187-212 (2007)

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A Reidian Reading Of Shakespeare's Macbeth: Exploring the Moral Faculty through Philosophy and Drama.Claire Landiss - 2013 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (2):145-166.details This essay takes a transhistorical leap to connect the philosophy of Thomas Reid to the dramatic presentation of ethical choices in Shakespeare's Macbeth. Juxtaposing the two figures reveals an underlying moral ontology common to both. This shared ontology is remarkably nuanced, ultimately affirming moral liberty whilst decisively registering the fallibility of the ‘moral faculty.’ The final section asks whether the degree of comparability warrants any further speculation, revisiting the question of a ‘common humanity.’. Download Export citation Bookmark
Thomas Reid on Character and Freedom.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2012 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (2):159-176.details According to Thomas Reid, an agent cannot be free unless she has the power to do otherwise. This claim is usually interpreted as a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Against this interpretation, I argue that Reid is committed to the seemingly paradoxical position that an agent may have the power to do otherwise despite the fact that it is impossible that she do otherwise. Reid's claim about the power to do otherwise does not, therefore, entail the Principle of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
William King on Free Will.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details William King's De Origine Mali contains an interesting, sophisticated, and original account of free will. King finds 'necessitarian' theories of freedom, such as those advocated by Hobbes and Locke, inadequate, but argues that standard versions of libertarianism commit one to the claim that free will is a faculty for going wrong. On such views, free will is something we would be better off without. King argues that both problems can be avoided by holding that we confer value on objects by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Using Benevolent Affections to Learn Our Duty.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):467-489.details The puzzle is this: I argue that for Reid, moral sense needs benevolent affections – i.e. some of our animal, non-cognitive principles of action – to apply the rules of duty. But he also thinks that duty can conflict with benevolent affections. So what happens in these conflict cases? I will argue that Reid takes moral psychology seriously and that he believes that our natural benevolent affections can be used as indicators of duty. Although creative, his account has a major (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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