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  1. Carnap and Achinstein on evidence.Frederick M. Kronz - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167.
    Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense (...)
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  • Hidden locality, conspiracy and superluminal signals.Frederick M. Kronz - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):420-444.
    This paper involves one crucial assumption; namely, that the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics for Bell's variant of the EPR experiment will continue to be verified as detector efficiencies are improved and the need for coincidence counters is eliminated. This assumption entails that any hidden-variables theory for quantum mechanics must violate Bell's inequality--the inequality derived in Bell (1964). It is shown here that four locality conditions are involved in the derivation of Bell's inequality; and that a violation of any of (...)
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  • Explanations in Microphysics: A response to van Fraassen's argument.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2008 - Principia 12 (1):49-72.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p49 The aim of this article is to offer a rejoinder to an argument against scientific realism put forward by van Fraassen, based on theoretical considerations regarding microphysics. At a certain stage of his general attack to scientific realism, van Fraassen argues, in contrast to what realists typically hold, that empirical regularities should sometimes be regarded as “brute facts”, which do not ask for explanation in terms of deeper, unobservable mechanisms. The argument from microphysics formulated by van Fraassen is based (...)
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