Husserl desarrolla un enfoque genético que busca dar cuenta del origen de las formas lógico-categoriales a partir de las correspondientes preestructuraciones situadas en el nivel de la receptividad sensible. Para un enfoque de ese tipo, la explicación del origen de las modalidades del juicio, en general, y la negación, en particular, plantea peculiares desafíos. El presente trabajo discute el modo en el que Husserl trata la negación, en tanto forma básica de la modalidad, tanto en el enfoque estático de Ideen (...) I como en el enfoque genético de Erfahrung und Urteil. A fin de poner de relieve el al-cance histórico y sistemático de la concepción husserliana, se proporciona previamente una presentación general de su contexto polémico inmediato. Este viene dado por la oposición entre psicologismo y formalismo, dominante en la filosofía de la lógica alemana de fines del siglo XIX y comienzos del siglo XX.Husserl develops a genetic approach that seeks to account for the origin of the logical-categorical forms starting from the corresponding pre-structures located at the level of sensitive receptivity. For such an approach, the explanation of the origin of the modalities of judgment, in general, and negation, in particular, poses peculiar challenges. This paper discusses how Husserl treats negation as a basic form of modality, both in the static approach of Ideen I and the genetic approach of Erfahrung und Urteil. Previously, in order to highlight the historical and systematic significance of the Husserlian conception, a general presentation of its immediate polemic context is offered, especially with reference to the opposition between psychologism and formalism, dominant in the German philosophy of logic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. (shrink)

The presentation of the formal conception of noemata is the main aim of the article. In the first section, three informal approaches to noemata are discussed. The goal of this chapter is specifying main controversies and their sources concerned with different ways of the understanding of noemata. In the second section, basic assumptions determining the proposed way of understanding noemata are presented. The third section is devoted to the formal set-theoretic construction needed for the formal comprehension of noemata. In the (...) fourth section, definitions of noemata and their various kinds, as well as definitions of other phenomenological notions are formulated. In the last section, possibilities of further developing the proposed formal conception are indicated. (shrink)

Presenting the first step-by-step commentary on Husserl’s Ideas I, Marcus Brainard’s Belief and Its Neutralization provides an introduction not only to this central work, but also to the whole of transcendental phenomenology. Brainard offers a clear and lively account of each key element in Ideas I, along with a novel reading of Husserl, one which may well cause scholars to reconsider many long-standing views on his thought, especially on the role of belief, the effect and scope of the epoché, and (...) the significance of the universal neutrality modification. (shrink)