Firms located in communities in which people are, on average, more trusting enjoy some benefits in terms of the power of CEO contracts. We present two pieces of empirical evidence to support this claim: (1) higher average trust in a county is associated with “flatter” executive contracts and (2) when an exogenous shock occurs (such as a scandal involving an important social institution), both trust and contracting move in similar directions. We obtain the first result in a panel specification and (...) the second in a “difference-in-difference” specification that uses the revelation of sex scandals involving the Catholic Church across different U.S. localities. (shrink)

The number of online courses in business schools is growing dramatically, but little has been published about teaching business ethics courses online. This article addresses key pedagogical design, delivery, student engagement, and assessment issues that should be considered when creating a high-quality, asynchronous online business ethics course for either undergraduate or graduate business student populations. Best practices are discussed within an integrative case study approach based on the experiences of a director of online faculty development and two accomplished online business (...) ethics instructors, one teaching at a small college and the other at a research-oriented university—their successes, learning opportunities, and recommendations. (shrink)

A variety of stakeholders have long been interested in the factors that are related to firm valuation. This article investigates why companies with more comprehensive corporate governance (CG) have a value premium over companies with less comprehensive CG. We posit and find that the cost of equity capital (COC) decreases with the strength of CG, suggesting that the value premium stems from the lower COC for more comprehensive CG. We also find that the COC is lower for companies with strong (...) commitment to business ethics (BE) than for those with weak commitment to BE and that the beneficial effect of CG on the COC is more pronounced for companies with weak commitment to BE than for those with strong commitment to BE. Companies with more comprehensive CG tend to exhibit strong commitment to BE, but the beneficial effect of corporate ethical commitment is not completely subsumed by CG. Our results suggest that companies could lower their cost of equity capital and increase firm value by adopting more comprehensive CG practices and committing to higher standards of BE. (shrink)

This paper presents the 'rationality-of-ends/market-structure grid'. With this grid, the article contrasts, in economic terms, different approaches to business ethics and addresses the question how far and what type of business ethics is feasible. Four basic scenarios for business ethics are outlined that imply different conceptualizations of business ethics. The grid interrelates a rationality-of-ends dimension with a market-structure dimension. The rationality-of-ends dimension ranges from opportunism and self-interested egoism to self-interested altruism and ultimately to authentic altruism. The market-structure dimension ranges from (...) perfect competition/no information problems/perfectly dispersed market power to imperfect competition/high information problems/concentrated power. Rather than presenting economic, legal, ethical and discretionary issues in a hierarchical fashion, the grid interrelates these issues. Conclusions are spelled out regarding the empirical observance of business ethics and the programmatic, 'theoretical' positions that are behind empirical observations. Practical implications for managers and public policy makers are outlined. (shrink)

In mainstream business and economics, prizes such as the Presidential Medal of Freedom are understood as special types of incentives, with the peculiar features of being awarded in public, and of having largely symbolic value. Informed by both historical considerations and philosophical instances, our study defines fundamental theoretical differences between incentives and prizes. The conceptual factors highlighted by our analytical framework are then tested through a laboratory experiment. The experimental exercise aims to analyze how prizes and incentives impact actual individuals’ (...) behavior differently. Our results show that both incentives (monetary and contingent) and prizes (non-monetary and discretional rewards) boost motivation to perform if awarded publicly, but only prizes crowd in motivation promoting virtuous attitude. (shrink)

This paper presents the ‘rationality‐of‐ends/market‐structure grid’. With this grid, the article contrasts, in economic terms, different approaches to business ethics and addresses the question how far and what type of business ethics is feasible. Four basic scenarios for business ethics are outlined that imply different conceptualizations of business ethics. The grid interrelates a rationality‐of‐ends dimension with a market‐structure dimension. The rationality‐of‐ends dimension ranges from opportunism and self‐interested egoism to self‐interested altruism and ultimately to authentic altruism. The market‐structure dimension ranges from (...) perfect competition/no information problems/perfectly dispersed market power to imperfect competition/high information problems/concentrated power. Rather than presenting economic, legal, ethical and discretionary issues in a hierarchical fashion, the grid interrelates these issues. Conclusions are spelled out regarding the empirical observance of business ethics and the programmatic, ‘theoretical’ positions that are behind empirical observations. Practical implications for managers and public policy makers are outlined. (shrink)