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Switch to: References
Citations of:
What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Trading Refugee Quotas?
Res Publica 19 (2):103-119 (2013)
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In the face of the desperate plight of refugees, virtually all moral and political philosophers, regardless of their general position on immigration controls, argue that states have a duty to grant asylum: people must not be turned back to countries where they would face persecution or severe human rights violations. Yet this consensus obscures a number of thorny ethical issues raised by the plight of the displaced. In this piece, I want to draw from recent writing in political and ethical (...) |
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In this article, I consider the neglected question of justice between states in the distribution of responsibility for refugees. I argue that a just distribution of refugees across states is an important normative goal and, accordingly, I attempt to rethink the normative foundations of the global refugee regime. I show that because dismantling the restrictive measures currently used by states in the global South to prevent the arrival of refugees will not suffice to ensure a just distribution of refugees between (...) |
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The asylum system faces problems on two fronts. States undermine it with populist politics, and migrants use it to satisfy their migration preferences. To address these problems, asylum services should be commodified. States should be able to pay other states to provide determination and protection-elsewhere. In this article, I aim to identify a way of implementing this idea that is both feasible and desirable. First, I sketch a policy proposal for a commodification of asylum services. Then, I argue that this (...) |
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States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya € 50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended (...) |
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Thousands of refugees die each year fleeing prosecution in their home state. But receiving states are often reluctant to admit, process and house refugees. This is in part because refugee protection is a public good, and so subject to free-riding. A promising, but controversial, solution is to set up markets in tradable refugee quotas (e.g., in the European Union). One of the main objections to such proposals is that they lead to the commodification and objectification of refugees. Another objection, less (...) |
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