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  1. Event Knowledge in Large Language Models: The Gap Between the Impossible and the Unlikely.Carina Kauf, Anna A. Ivanova, Giulia Rambelli, Emmanuele Chersoni, Jingyuan Selena She, Zawad Chowdhury, Evelina Fedorenko & Alessandro Lenci - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (11):e13386.
    Word co‐occurrence patterns in language corpora contain a surprising amount of conceptual knowledge. Large language models (LLMs), trained to predict words in context, leverage these patterns to achieve impressive performance on diverse semantic tasks requiring world knowledge. An important but understudied question about LLMs’ semantic abilities is whether they acquire generalized knowledge of common events. Here, we test whether five pretrained LLMs (from 2018's BERT to 2023's MPT) assign a higher likelihood to plausible descriptions of agent−patient interactions than to minimally (...)
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  • Discourse coherence modulates use of predictive processing during sentence comprehension.Georgia-Ann Carter & Paul Hoffman - 2024 - Cognition 242 (C):105637.
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  • Event‐Predictive Cognition: A Root for Conceptual Human Thought.Martin V. Butz, Asya Achimova, David Bilkey & Alistair Knott - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (1):10-24.
    Butz, Achimova, Bilkey, and Knott provide a topic overview and discuss whether the special issue contributions may imply that event‐predictive abilities constitute a root for conceptual human thought, because they enable complex, mutually beneficial, but also intricately competitive, social interactions and language communication.
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  • Resourceful Event-Predictive Inference: The Nature of Cognitive Effort.Martin V. Butz - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Pursuing a precise, focused train of thought requires cognitive effort. Even more effort is necessary when more alternatives need to be considered or when the imagined situation becomes more complex. Cognitive resources available to us limit the cognitive effort we can spend. In line with previous work, an information-theoretic, Bayesian brain approach to cognitive effort is pursued: to solve tasks in our environment, our brain needs to invest information, that is, negative entropy, to impose structure, or focus, away from a (...)
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  • Bayesian Surprise Predicts Human Event Segmentation in Story Listening.Manoj Kumar, Ariel Goldstein, Sebastian Michelmann, Jeffrey M. Zacks, Uri Hasson & Kenneth A. Norman - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (10):e13343.
    Event segmentation theory posits that people segment continuous experience into discrete events and that event boundaries occur when there are large transient increases in prediction error. Here, we set out to test this theory in the context of story listening, by using a deep learning language model (GPT‐2) to compute the predicted probability distribution of the next word, at each point in the story. For three stories, we used the probability distributions generated by GPT‐2 to compute the time series of (...)
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  • Emergent Goal‐Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event‐Predictive Learning and Inference.Christian Gumbsch, Maurits Adam, Birgit Elsner & Martin V. Butz - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (8).
    Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 8, August 2021.
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  • Constructing Expertise: Surmounting Performance Plateaus by Tasks, by Tools, and by Techniques.Wayne D. Gray & Sounak Banerjee - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (4):610-665.
    Acquiring expertise in a task is often thought of as an automatic process that follows inevitably with practice according to the log‐log law (aka: power law) of learning. However, as Ericsson, Chase, and Faloon (1980) showed, this is not true for digit‐span experts and, as we show, it is certainly not true for Tetris players at any level of expertise. Although some people may simply “twitch” faster than others, the limit to Tetris expertise is not raw keypress time but the (...)
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