This essay tries to demarcate and analyse Artificial Intelligence ethics. Going away from the traditional distinction in normative, meta, and applied ethics, a different split is executed, inspired by the three most prominent schools of thought: deontology, consequentialism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. The reason behind this alternative approach is to connect all three schools back to ancient Greek philosophy. Having proven that the majority of arguments derive from some ancient Greek scholars, a new voice is initiated into the discussion, Protagoras (...) the Sophist. A big advocate of -the later conceived- humanism and relativism, Protagoras is used as a prism to examine a new ethical model that is based on the personalization of agents. In other words, even though theories of objectivity have overflown contemporary discussions of finding a robust ethical model for Artificial Intelligence agents, there is potential in a subjective model, personalised after each and every user. (shrink)

This paper aims to justify the concept of natural intelligence in the biosemiotic context. I will argue that the process of life is (i) a cognitive/semiotic process and (ii) that organisms, from bacteria to animals, are cognitive or semiotic agents. To justify these arguments, the neural-type intelligence represented by the form of reasoning known as anthropic reasoning will be compared and contrasted with types of intelligence explicated by four disciplines of biology – relational biology, evolutionary epistemology, biosemiotics and the systems (...) view of life – not biased towards neural intelligence. The comparison will be achieved by asking questions related to the process of observation and the notion of true observers. To answer the questions I will rely on a range of established concepts including SETI (search for extraterrestrial intelligence), Fermi’s paradox, bacterial cognition, versions of the panspermia theory, as well as some newly introduced concepts including biocivilisations, cognitive/semiotic universes, and the cognitive/semiotic multiverse. The key point emerging from the answers is that the process of cognition/semiosis – the essence of natural intelligence – is a biological universal. (shrink)

To a greater extent than in other technical domains, research and progress in Artificial Intelligence has always been entwined with the fictional. Its language echoes strongly with other forms of cultural narratives, such as fairytales, myth and religion. In this essay we present varied examples that illustrate how these analogies have guided not only readings of the AI enterprise by commentators outside the community but also inspired AI researchers themselves. Owing to their influence, we pay particular attention to the similarities (...) between religious language and the way in which the potential advent of greater than human intelligence is presented contemporarily. We then move on to the role that fiction, science fiction most of all, has historically played and is still playing in the discussion of AI by influencing researchers and the public, shifting the weights of different scenarios in our collectively perceived probability space. We sum up by arguing that the lore surrounding AI research, ancient and modern, points to the ancestral and shared human motivations that drive researchers in their pursuit and fascinate humanity at large. These points of narrative entanglement where AI meets the wider culture should serve to amplify the call to engage ourselves with the discussion of the potential destination of this technology. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is the self-proclaimed inventor of the binary system and is considered as such by most historians of mathematics and/or mathematicians. Really though, we owe the groundwork of today’s computing not to Leibniz but to the Englishman Thomas Harriot and the Spaniard Juan Caramuel de Lobkowitz, whom Leibniz plagiarized. This plagiarism has been identified on the basis of several facts: Caramuel’s work on the binary system is earlier than Leibniz’s, Leibniz was acquainted—both directly and indirectly—with Caramuel’s work and (...) Leibniz had a natural tendency to plagiarize scientific works. (shrink)

All SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) programmes that were conceived and put into practice since the 1960s have been based on anthropocentric ideas concerning the definition of intelligence on a cosmic-wide scale. Brain-based neuronal intelligence, augmented by AI, are currently thought of as being the only form of intelligence that can engage in SETI-type interactions, and this assumption is likely to be connected with the dilemma of the famous Fermi paradox. We argue that high levels of intelligence and cognition inherent (...) in ensembles of bacteria are much more likely to be the dominant form of cosmic intelligence, and the transfer of such intelligence is enabled by the processes of panspermia. We outline the main principles of bacterial intelligence, and how this intelligence may be used by the planetary-scale bacterial system, or the bacteriosphere, through processes of biological tropism, to connect to any extra-terrestrial microbial forms, independently of human interference. (shrink)

Criminal liability for acts committed by AI systems has recently become a hot legal topic. This paper includes three different contributions. The first contribution is an analysis of the extent to which an AI system can satisfy the requirements for criminal liability: accomplishing an actus reus, having the corresponding mens rea, possessing the cognitive capacities needed for responsibility. The second contribution is a discussion of criminal activity accomplished by an AI entity, with reference to a recent case involving an online (...) bot, the Random Darknet Shopper. This discussion will provide the context for the analysis of commonalities and differences between criminal activities by humans and by artificial systems. The third contribution concerns the evaluation of different ways of addressing criminal activities by AI systems in a regulatory perspective. (shrink)

If, as a number of writers have predicted, the computers of the future will possess intelligence and capacities that exceed our own then it seems as though they will be worthy of a moral respect at least equal to, and perhaps greater than, human beings. In this paper I propose a test to determine when we have reached that point. Inspired by Alan Turing’s (1950) original “Turing test”, which argued that we would be justified in conceding that machines could think (...) if they could fill the role of a person in a conversation, I propose a test for when computers have achieved moral standing by asking when a computer might take the place of a human being in a moral dilemma, such as a “triage” situation in which a choice must be made as to which of two human lives to save. We will know that machines have achieved moral standing comparable to a human when the replacement of one of these people with an artificial intelligence leaves the character of the dilemma intact. That is, when we might sometimes judge that it is reasonable to preserve the continuing existence of a machine over the life of a human being. This is the “Turing Triage Test”. I argue that if personhood is understood as a matter of possessing a set of important cognitive capacities then it seems likely that future AIs will be able to pass this test. However this conclusion serves as a reductio of this account of the nature of persons. I set out an alternative account of the nature of persons, which places the concept of a person at the centre of an interdependent network of moral and affective responses, such as remorse, grief and sympathy. I argue that according to this second, superior, account of the nature of persons, machines will be unable to pass the Turing Triage Test until they possess bodies and faces with expressive capacities akin to those of the human form. (shrink)

This paper instigates a discourse on the unplanned effects of intelligent agents in the context of their use on the Internet. By utilizing a social informatics framework as a lens of analysis, the study identifies several unanticipated consequences of using intelligent agents for information- and commerce-based tasks on the Internet. The effects include those that transpire over time at the organizational level, such as e-commerce transformation, operational encumbrance and security overload, as well as those that emerge on a cultural level, (...) such as trust affliction, skills erosion, privacy attrition and social detachment. Furthermore, three types of impacts are identified: economic, policy, and social. The discussion contends that economic impacts occur on the organizational level, social effects transpire on a cultural level, and policy impacts take place on both levels. These effects of the use of intelligent agents have seldom been predicted and discussed by visionaries, researchers, and practitioners in the field. The knowledge of these unplanned outcomes can improve our understanding of the overall impacts that innovative agent technologies may potentially have on organizations and individuals. Subsequently, this may help us develop better agent applications, facilitate the formulation of appropriate contingencies, and provide impetus for future research. (shrink)

Future developments in artificial intelligence (AI) will likely allow for a greater degree of human‐machine convergence, with machines becoming more humanlike and intelligent machinery becoming more integrated into human brain function. This will pose many ethical challenges, and the necessity for a moral framework for evaluating these challenges will grow. This paper argues that community concern constitutes a central factor in both the evolution of religion and the human brain, and as such it should be used as the organizing principle (...) for moral evaluations of AI technologies. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore some of the ways in which Artificial Intelligence (AI) is mediated discursively. I assume that AI is informed by an “ancestral dream” to reproduce nature by artificial means. This dream drives the production of “cyborg discourse”, which hinges on the belief that human nature (especially intelligence) can be reduced to symbol manipulation and hence replicated in a machine. Cyborg discourse, I suggest, produces AI systems by rhetorical means; it does not merely describe AI systems or (...) reflect a set of prevailing attitudes about technology. To support this argument, I analyse a set of research articles about an “embodied conversational agent” called the Real Estate Agent (REA). The articles about REA mobilise a set of rhetorical strategies that systematically downplay the system’s artificiality and bolster its humanlike qualities. Within the context of the dream of AI to produce humanlike machines, and given our strong bias for human-human interaction, the designers’ claim to REA’s humanness in their research articles, as I argue in the final section of this paper, needs little justification. (shrink)

In recent years, neuroscience has been a particularly prolific discipline stimulating many innovative treatment approaches in medicine. However, when it comes to the brain, new techniques of intervention do not always meet with a positive public response, in spite of promising therapeutic benefits. The reason for this caution clearly is the brain’s special importance as “organ of the mind”. As such it is widely held to be the origin of mankind’s unique position among living beings. Likewise, on the level of (...) the individual human being, the brain is considered the material substrate of those traits that in combination render each person unique. In view of this preeminent significance of the brain, it is understandable that, in general, interventions into the brain are considered a delicate issue and that new techniques of intervention are scrutinised with particular care. However, in doing so it is important not to go to the opposite extreme and shy away from promising new therapeutic approaches for debilitating disorders of the brain. With respect to the new techniques of brain intervention a broad interdisciplinary perspective is required to discern irrational fear from justified concern. Hence, the Europäische Akademie established a project group consisting, on the one hand, of experts from different fields of medicine who have got first-hand experience of applying the techniques at issue and, on the other hand, of philosophers and a legal expert. The task of this team was to review the state of the art with respect to each single technique of intervening in the brain, to indicate future developments, and to address the ethical and legal issues common to all of them. The project’s outcome is the book at hand. (shrink)

The growing interest in AI in advance capitalist societies can be understood not just in relation to its practial achievements, which remain modest, but also in its ideological role as a technological paradign for the reconstruction of capitalism. This is similar to the role played by scientific management during the second industrial revolution, circa 1880–1930, and involves the extension of the rationalization and routinization of labour to mental work. The conception of human intelligence and the emphasis on command and control (...) systems of much contemporary AI research reflects its close relationship with the US military and corporate capital, which are the sources of many of AI's key metaphors and anolgies. (shrink)

As the physical and digital worlds interact,some fields of technoscience have started toshift from an approach emphasizing simulation –in which the physical is replicated in thedigital – to one focusing on augmentation, inwhich the digital is utilized to enhance thephysical. A good place to study theimplications this shift has on the individualis the field of personal wearable technologies.Here, the body is not simply extended byinformation and communication technologies(ICTs), but also becomes their intimate host.This represents a new step in theconceptualization of (...) the synergy betweenindividual (body) and technology (environment),and also affects the ways in which the role andcharacter of each actor are defined. This paperexplores some of the theoreticalre-orientations underpinning the development ofwearable computers and how these shape therelationship between body and environment. (shrink)

Rapid advances in nanoscience and nanotechnology are profoundly influencing the ways in which we conceptualize the world of the future, and human ability to manipulate matter at the atomic and molecular levels offers previously unimagined possibilities for scientific discovery and technological applications. The convergence of nanotechnology with biotechnology, information technology, cognitive science, and engineering may hold promise for the improvement of human performance at a number of levels. Based on a National Science Foundation-funded Research Experiences for Undergraduates Program in nanoscience (...) and nanotechnology at the University of Central Florida (summer 2002), a variety of social and ethical issues associated with these advances is discussed. Implications for the future of science-technology-society studies and K-16 science education also are presented. (shrink)

I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity;” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand how new technologies employed to modify the body; brain; and consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing reserve.” Under transhumanism; the body is enframed as an external; technologically modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that (...) might arise when our own bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further; I argue that; by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable; we will be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby; Daniel Sarewitz; and Andy Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure death as a foundational possibility for Dasein; transhumanism poses the danger of hiding the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology; Truth; and ultimately to Dasein itself. (shrink)

This exegesis questions and explores the types of identities that are emerging as a result of human engagement with contemporary communications and media technology. These identities are communicated, shaped and defined by the way we appropriate and engage with a smorgasbord of communications and media consumption technologies which merge in our imaginations to form a technosocial mediascape. As artist and teacher, consumer and prosumer, I participate in the technosocial mediascape, along with colleagues, students, artists, friends and family members. As we (...) produce, communicate and ultimately co-create that technosocial environment, how are we changed by this experience? We contribute to a diverse and globally circulating, but paradoxically transient parade of data and media that apparatuses and humans together bring into existence. How does this mediascape impact on human ontology and sociology? What are the different ‘positions’—relationships with the mediascape—that emerge? My method derives from analysis of my own experience as an engaged and flexible ‘position-taker’ within the technosocial mediascape. I analyse my own creative practice with reference to a range of modernist, postmodernist and media theories. The technosocial enshrines the idea that technology and human behaviour are not separable, and draws on many theoretical sources, including phenomenology, the philosophy of language, design theory and digital media theory. All media, and mediums, are technosocial, because they impact on the praxis of identity. However, a range of contemporary media and mediums are more explicitly technosocial, and that is where my focus lies. I will suggest that the role of language in technosocial contexts is peculiar, important and under-theorised. Our ‘linguistic apparatuses’ offer an alternate concept of technology to the ‘heavy modernism’ of Martin Heidegger. I will explore ways in which technosocial engagement privileges fluid identities which drift in and out of different but co-existing realities. Various types of ‘immersion’—some neo-baroque and some neo-romantic—contribute to technosocially-engaged identity construction. Thus, our engagement with the technosocial mediascape challenges received ideas about personal identity, and indeed, the nature of the real. (shrink)