A major challenge in global sales research is helping managers understand sales ethics across countries. Addressing this challenge, our research investigates whether a few demographic variables and psychographic variables reduce unethical sales behaviors (USBs) in Canada, Mexico, and the USA. Further, using literatures associated with business ethics, national culture, and customer orientation advocacy, we hypothesize why sales managers should expect similarities and differences in USBs between countries. We tested hypotheses using a sales contest scenario and six USBs, examining survey responses (...) from 948 business-to-business salespeople of a multinational company’s sales force in Canada, Mexico, and the USA. The results reveal that several psychographic variables (such as commitment, relationship to sales manager, and achievement need) affect salespeople’s tendency to engage in USBs differently in each country. In addition, business ethics, individualism, and customer orientation advocacy associated with each country can be used to anticipate similarities and differences in USBs between countries. This research offers important theoretical contributions and implications for more effectively managing sales forces and reducing USBs across countries. (shrink)

We explore two dimensions of situational factors expected to influence decision-making about ethical issues among sales representatives – universal vs. particular and direct vs. indirect. We argue that these distinctions are important theoretically, methodologically, and managerially. We test our hypotheses by means of a survey of 252 sales representatives. Our results confirm that considering universal and particular and direct and indirect situational factors contributes to our understanding of decision-making about ethical issues within a sales context, specifically willingness to engage in (...) an unethical act. We also find that personal factors act independently and interact with situational factors in decision-making about ethical issues. Both demographic factors, age and gender, and personality factors, Machiavellianism and self-monitoring, have main effects on decision-making, and some of these factors interact with situational factors to affect decision-making. For example, age of the decision-maker (younger) and size of commission (larger) interact such that the likelihood of choosing an unethical alternative is greater. (shrink)

Couched in positive agency theory, it is shown that the straight-commission compensation system (SCCS) creates a conflict of interest between the agent''s and the client''s self-interests. Based on this, it is hypothesized that the SCCS will encourage agents to intend to act unethically towards their clients. Two hundred and forty five insurance agents in the U.S. were surveyed, with 59% responding. The results suggest that the SCCS does not significantly affect agents'' ethical intentions, positively or negatively. This lack of empirical (...) evidence may be due to the unique nature of the sample. Indeed, the company which enabled this sample appears to have found a practical solution to temper the potential negative effects of the SCCS in its commitment to selective hiring and marketing products which benefit both the client and the agent. (shrink)

Lawsuits alleging illegal and unethical insurance sales practices have received widespread publicity in recent years. Although many observers have argued that one source of ethical conflicts for insurance agents is the industry's reliance on straight commission compensation, there remains a paucity of empirical data to support the claim. Therefore, we tested whether different forms of compensation influence insurance agent recommendations of products. We obtained survey responses from 336 insurance agents. Respondents were presented with a composite sketch of a hypothetical client. (...) Following this description, they were asked to identify which one of eight specified life insurance products they would recommend to the client. A between-groups design was employed to manipulate differences in compensation associated with the eight products. Results indicated that neither amount of coverage nor type of coverage (term life versus cash value) recommended was associated with compensation. However, an unanticipated finding was that amount of coverage recommended was significantly higher when the insured was male than when the insured was female. (shrink)

In 1986, President Reagan created the Packard Commission, a blue-ribbon commission to investigate defense contracting procurement fraud. The Packard Commission''s major recommendation was for defense contractors to adopt ethics programs. Out of this recommendation emerged the Defense Industry Initiative (DII). This paper examines this Initiative and focuses on the DII''s six principles. In particular, this paper explores the implications the DII has had with respect to (1) pursuing intra-industry cooperation and setting industry-wide standards; (2) monitoring compliance; (3) the paradox inherent (...) to the DII as a facilitator for industry self-regulation; and, (4) why companies have enthusiastically adopted the directive. This paper concludes that the DII falls short of being an effective method of self-regulation because: (1) it does not achieve complete industry-wide cooperation; (2) it does not establish uniform standards of ethical conduct within the industry; (3) it does not hold the signatory companies accountable for creating a strong system of ethical conduct; and, (4) it does not relieve the organizational and market pressures to be unethical. (shrink)

This paper argues that current accountability mechanisms are inadequate to ensure that straight-commissioned agents meet their fiduciary obligations to their clients. In doing so, using agency theory, it revisits how the straight-commission compensation system creates agents’ dueling loyalties and recommends mechanisms of accountability organizations, agents, and/or clients can recognize and employ to ensure agents’ fiduciary obligations to their clients.

Despite the extensive body of literature that aims to explain the phenomenon of consumer scams, the structure of information in scam relationships remains relatively understudied. The purpose of this article is to develop an agency-theoretic approach to the study of information in perpetrator–victim interactions. Drawing a distinction between failures of observation and failures of judgment in the pre-contract phase, we introduce a typology and a set of propositions that explain the severity of adverse selection problems in three classes of scam (...) relationships. Our analysis provides a novel, systematic explanation of the structure of information that facilitates scam victimization, while also enabling critical scrutiny of a core assumption in agency theory regarding contract design. We highlight the role of scam perpetrators as agents who have access to private information and exercise considerable control over the terms and design of scam relationships. Focusing on the consumer scam context, we question a theoretical assumption, largely taken for granted in the agency literature, that contact design is necessarily in the purview of the uninformed principal. (shrink)