I offer a detailed discussion of the connections Lani Watson posits in her book The Right to Know between violations of a person’s epistemic rights on the one hand and the distinctively epistemic forms of injustice influentially discussed in the work of Miranda Fricker on the other. I argue that if we specify the content of the relevant epistemic rights (and the corresponding duties of others) carefully enough, it becomes plausible that there is an even tighter relationship between violations of (...) these rights and various epistemic injustices than Watson claims. I close by tabling a speculative suggestion on the significance of this conclusion. (shrink)

Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival (...) forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there’s a harder challenge that can’t. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world. (shrink)

This paper discusses two important emphases of epistemology – of virtue and vice epistemology in particular – one concerning agency and patiency, and the other concerning self-regard and other-regard. The paper offers, for the first time in the literature, a framework in which four types of epistemological work can be categorized according to their respective dual emphases: Type 1 (agent/self-regarding), Type 2 (agent/other-regarding), Type 3 (patient/self-regarding), and Type 4 (patient/other-regarding). The paper also shows how four ways of doing epistemology can (...) be categorized in terms of these four types and draws particular attention to one dubbed other-centering. (shrink)

This article seeks to shed light on debates about the right to be forgotten by offering a new account of the right as grounded in the confidence that the direction of one’s life is up to one and worth the trouble that it takes to direct it. I show how this confidence is supported by what the right actually provides: the possibility of new social interactions unconditioned by information about one’s past. This view avoids pitfalls facing other accounts of the (...) right’s moral basis, clarifies its relation to rights of privacy, and resolves several puzzles thought to face its practical application. (shrink)

Roma in Europe are suffering from manifold injustices and are subject to serious discrimination; carried out both interpersonally as well as institutionally. As with most forms of oppression, the oppression of Roma has a long history in Europe. This paper shows how a genealogy of the oppression of Roma in Europe provides a more adequate understanding of the oppression that Roma face within Europe nowadays. Furthermore, the paper delineates the particular epistemic features of said oppression with the help of some (...) examples and argues that it takes three forms: epistemic segregation, dominant intelligibility frameworks of white supremacy, and dismissal of ‘the right to be known’. The paper then uses the epistemic dimension of the ongoing oppression to argue that Roma can be accurately described as (a) internally colonized subjects and (b) as suffering from internal colonization – in the midst of Europe. (shrink)