Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my (...) account portrays honor norms as radically different from liberal ones, it actually strengthens Doris and Plakias’ case in some respects: cultures of honor are not merely superficially different from Western liberal ones. Nonetheless, the persistent appeal of honor’s principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, but pluralism—a reply on behalf of realism that itself has considerable empirical support. (shrink)

Ideally, good sports literature illuminates the subtle moral contours of sports reality. We ask in this paper how modern Icelandic literature describes sport-related ethical issues and attitudes. Our findings indicate that, in stark contrast to the rampant egocentrism, individual vice and misconduct blighting Icelandic sports reality, modern Icelandic prose literature typically either ignores this reality or refers to sports as if they were in full harmony with idealised ancient virtues and morals. Our conclusion is that this discrepancy admits of four (...) possible interpretations: that (1) theories about the individualism and egocentricity of modernity do not apply in Iceland and in Icelandic sports; (2) the writers are seriously self-deceived; (3) the writers write their books for the deliberate purpose of deceiving the public; (4) the writers write their books for the deliberate purpose of preaching. Our answer is that, while there may be reason to foreground (4), the explanation lies in a combination of those four factors. (shrink)

Pacing, a phenomenon whereby seasoned runners assist other runners toward pre-determined goal times in races of various lengths, is a common practice, yet it has received very little sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper aims to take steps in that direction with a particular focus on pacing in amateur distance running. We begin with Peter Arnold’s analysis of the three views of sportsmanship – as a form of social union, as a means in the promotion of pleasure, and as a form (...) of altruism – to examine how well pacing fares in each. Additionally, we incorporate the concepts of the ‘dynamogenic agent’ from William James and the ‘intermediate man’ from John Lachs, which raise questions of autonomy, authenticity, and assistance. Furthermore, we provide descriptions of how the unique qualities of pace groups in running exemplify sportsmanship in ways that bolster Arnold’s analysis. While we write from an analytical position with regard to the topic, we also write from our own Emersonian ‘angle of vision’,.. (shrink)