We examine the issues concerning the legality and ethicality of the Second Amendment right to bear arms balanced by the employer's duty to provide a safe workplace for its employees. Two court rulings highlight this balancing act: McDonald et al. v. City of Chicago et al. and District of Columbia v. Heller. “Stand Your Ground” and “Castle Doctrine” laws in the recent Trayvon Martin shooting on February 26, 2012 are also applicable. Various ethical frameworks examine the firearms debate by viewing (...) the Second Amendment from three perspectives. These include a pro‐gun perspective drawing upon libertarianism and fundamental rights; a moderate gun perspective drawing upon consequentialism and stakeholder theory; and finally, an anti‐gun perspective drawing upon a Public Health Ethics and peace ethics approach. We explore the issue of gun control from a business perspective as employers face ethical decisions in responding to legislation that allows guns in the workplace and/or in employer parking lots while still being responsible to provide a safe workplace for their employees. We make recommendations regarding how companies should manage by proactively avoiding legal challenges to employees' rights to own and carry guns into the workplace. This includes emphasis on enhanced security, Human Resource policies and monitoring rapidly changing laws. (shrink)

Wheeler, Stark, and Stell have raised many interesting briefly expand on, the proposal I offered in the original points concerning gun control that merit extended treat- paper.' ment. Here, however, I will focus only on two. I wiII then In earlier papers and also in this symposium, Wheeler argues that ov,ming arms is defensible as a means of resisting governmental assaults against indivicluals. If only governments have guns, he argues, then a gover'n- ment gone bad can easily oppress its citizens. (...) An armed citizenry, hov ever, might be able to deflect B governmental assault. Because "governments are among the more serious threats to one's rights,... there is Bt least a p.ima facie right to v hatever means are necessary to deflect threats to rights."' Not only is this a prima I'acie right, he argues, but given the history of governmental oppression, it is an actual right — indeecl a right that should be rec ognized by any legitimate government. (shrink)

Wheeler, Stark, and Stell have raised many interesting points concerning gun control that merit extended treatment. Here, however, I will focus only on two. I will then briefly expand on the proposal I offered in the original paper.

I argue that location-specific gun bans are typically unjust. If there is a right to carry firearms outside of one’s home, then the state cannot prohibit gun owners from carrying their firearms into certain areas without assuming a special duty of protecting those whom it coercively disarms. This task is practically impossible in most of the areas where guns are commonly banned. Gun owners should therefore be allowed to carry their guns in most public places, including college campuses.

Perhaps the biggest disconnect between philosophers and non-philosophers on the question of gun rights is over the relevance of arms to our dignitary interests. This essay attempts to address this gap by arguing that we have a strong prima facie moral right to resist with dignity and that violence is sometimes our most or only dignified method of resistance. Thus, we have a strong prima facie right to guns when they are necessary often enough for effective dignified resistance. This approach (...) is distinctively non-libertarian: it doesn’t justify gun rights on the basis of (mere) liberty or security. Nonetheless it is compatible with libertarian defenses of gun rights based on a liberty right to guns, and, if sound, in fact lowers the bar for gun rights in some ways, as it justifies access to guns even when nonviolent means would better achieve the liberty or security aims of potential victims. And although this defense of gun rights is most readily categorized as “conservative” or rightist, it relies upon principles and intuitions about dignity popular among progressives in other domains, such as in disability, women’s, or LGBT rights debates. (shrink)

In addressing the shape of appropriate gun policy, this essay assumes for the sake of discussion that there is a legal and moral right to private gun ownership. My thesis is that, against the background of this right, the most defensible policy approach in the United States would feature moderate gun control. The first section summarizes the American gun control status quo and characterizes what I call “moderate gun control.” The next section states and rebuts six leading arguments against this (...) general approach to gun policy. The section that follows presents a positive case for moderate gun control that emphasizes safety in the home and society as well as rights whose enforcement entails some limits or qualifications on the right to bear arms. A final section shows how the recommended gun regulations address legitimate purposes, rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on gun rights, and offers concluding reflections. (shrink)

This paper discusses the views of Wheeler and LaFollette on the right to bear arms. It argues, with LaFollette and against Wheeler that the right to bear arms is derivative and not a fundamental right. My argument pivots on the idea that Wheeler's account of what makes a right fundamental is too broad.

The right to self‐defense has played a major role in objections to gun regulation. Many contend that gun regulations threaten this right. While much philosophical discussion has focused on the relation between guns and this right, less attention has been paid to the argument for the right of self‐defense itself. In this article, I examine this argument. Gunrights defenders contend that the right of self‐defense is needed to explain why interferences in self‐defense are wrong. I propose an alternative explanation for (...) such wrongs, one which does not posit the existence of a self‐defense right, and then show how it undermines their claim that there exists a strong presumption against gun regulation. I conclude by articulating the implications of this alternative explanatory account for other rights. (shrink)

There is a general presumption against arming outlaw states. But can that presumption sometimes be overturned? The argument considered here maintains that outlaw states can have legitimate security interests and that transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not follow from the (...) fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself, and while an outlaw state’s primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens’ interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents. (shrink)

On April 16, 2007, Cho Seung-Hui used two semiautomatic handguns to kill 32 persons and then himself at Virginia Tech University in the largest campus shooting in U.S. history. Mr. Cho purchased his handguns from a pawnshop and a gun store in Virginia, where under state law a background check was conducted to determine whether he had any disqualifying criminal or mental health history. The paperwork for the background check was completed at the gun store, and the check itself was (...) conducted through an “instant” system facilitated by a toll-free telephone number. The entire transaction took approximately 20 minutes. At no point was Mr. Cho asked why he wished to purchase the guns. And although he had been deemed a potential danger to himself by a state magistrate in 2005 – which should have disqualified his purchase of a gun under federal law – this information never reached those conducting the background check. (shrink)

The moral right to keep and bear arms is entailed by the moral right of self-defense. We argue that the ownership and use of firearms is a reasonable means of exercising these rights. Given their defensive value, there is a strong presumption in favor of enacting civil rights to keep and bear arms ranging from handguns to ‘assault rifles.’ Thus, states are morally obliged as a matter of justice to recognize basic liberties for firearm ownership and usage. Throughout this paper (...) we build upon the relevant criminological and social science research in addition to the work of other philosophers who have in recent years argued in favor of gun rights. Although we believe the statistical evidence supports our case, our argument is primarily non-consequentialist. We do, however, address consequentialist objections in the last section of this paper. (shrink)

Although the problem of adaptiveness plays an important motivating role in her work on human capabilities, Martha Nussbaum never gives a clear account of the controversial concept of adaptive preferences on which she relies. In this paper, I aim both to reconstruct the most plausible account of the concept that may be attributed to Nussbaum and to provide a critical appraisal of that account. Although her broader work on the capabilities approach moves progressively towards political liberalism as time passes, I (...) aim to show that her account of adaptive preferences continues to maintain her earlier commitment to perfectionism about the good. I then distinguish between two obligatory kinds of respect for persons, which I call, respectively, primary and secondary recognition respect. This distinction allows us to see that her perfectionist account of adaptive preferences allows her to show persons primary but not secondary recognition respect. Ultimately, I claim that an acceptable account of adaptive prefer.. (shrink)

Wer Politikwissenschaft studiert, lernt, was gute empirische Arbeiten ausmacht. Wie sieht es aber in der Politischen Theorie aus? Wie kann man systematisch ergründen, was gerecht ist oder welche Entscheidungen Politiker:innen treffen sollten? Wie erweitert die Positive Politische Theorie den Horizont empirischer Erklärungen? Was macht eine überzeugende Interpretation historischer Texte aus – und was können Studierende in einer Hausarbeit zu den großen Klassikern noch sagen? Dieses Lehrbuch vermittelt das Handwerkszeug, um Probleme in der Positiven wie Normativen Politischen Theorie und Ideengeschichte eigenständig (...) anzugehen – anwendungsorientiert und leicht verständlich, verknüpft mit Argumentationstheorie und Grundlagen des wissenschaftlichen Arbeitens. (shrink)

In this essay I explore efforts at regulating race-related speech on publicly funded colleges and universities. In the first section, I present the scope of the current debate about the topic: what speech is, contexts in which it is found, etc. In the second section, I present the case for unrestricted speech on campuses for the advancement of knowledge and social progress. The third section addresses standard problem cases for free speech like the non-scientific nature of racist epithets, existential threats (...) to the university, and involuntary exposure to racist speech. The fourth section explores arguments for regulating speech coming from critical race theorists and those who question the cultural narrative surrounding speech these days. In the fifth section, I lay bare the irreconcilable incompatibilities of free speech proponents and advocates of speech restrictions in several areas. The conclusion points the way forward toward by calling attention to the lingering questions about the values of knowledge and social progress. (shrink)

Menschen haben ein Anscheinsrecht (engl. prima facie right), Schusswaffen zu besitzen. Dieses Recht ist bedeutsam sowohl in Hinblick auf die Rolle, die Waffenbesitz im Leben von Waffenbegeisterten spielt, als auch auf den Selbstverteidigungsnutzen von Schusswaffen. Dieses Recht wird auch nicht durch den gesellschaftlichen Schaden privaten Waffenbesitzes verdrängt. Dieser Schaden wurde stark aufgebauscht und ist vermutlich erheblich kleiner als der Nutzen privaten Waffenbesitzes. Und ich lege dar, dass der Schaden den Nutzen um ein Vielfaches übertreffen müsste, um ein Verbot von Schusswaffen (...) zu rechtfertigen. [This is a German translation of: „Is There a Right to Own a Gun?“, Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 297-324.]. (shrink)

The Second Amendment is accepted as protecting a right, but it is commonly accepted that the right is not unrestricted. I will explore the most commonly suggested restrictions proposed by gun control advocates and show why these restrictions to the Second Amendment are unjustifiably high, especially when compared with restrictions we accept for other Constitutional rights. I argue that these restrictions violate a central function of the Second Amendment—to enable the people to protect themselves against a tyrannical government. The three (...) restrictions I will be discussing are: licensing requirements for gun ownership, gun tracing with a national database of gun owners, and concealed carry restrictions. (shrink)