The definitive establishment of public-private governance has forced to abandon the theories of political autonomy that were valid until a few decades ago. In return, there has been a boom in the autonomy of the right conceived as a recovery of the natural law inherent to Human Rights. This article rescues from oblivion the two main criticisms made in the second half of the twentieth century to Human Rights: that of the conservative jurist Ernst Forsthoff and that of the Marxist (...) philosopher Antonio Negri. Although these thinkers are completely antagonistic from the point of view of their political projects, both agree that, in the current technical societies where collaborative work prevails, the liberal conception of right is no longer able to function as a guarantor of the freedoms and empowerment of citizens: it has lost all capacity for control and organization of material production relationships. (shrink)

En este artículo propongo una justificación de la democracia, y de la autoridad política derivada de ella, a partir del ideal republicano de libertad como no-dominación. Argumento que los procedimientos democráticos tienen valor por sí mismos porque son mecanismos de decisión donde hay libertad de forma recíproca. Después muestro que la autoridad debe ser adecuadamente controlada para evitar que exista dominación, razón por la cual tiene que concebirse como una relación fiduciaria, en la que los gobernantes actúan como agentes de (...) la ciudadanía. Finalmente, establezco la necesidad de que los gobernantes cumplan con deberes fiduciarios y que los ciudadanos desarrollen virtudes cívicas. In this article I propose a justification of democracy, and of the political authority derived from it, based on the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination. I argue that democratic procedures have value in themselves because they are decision-making mechanisms where there is freedom on a reciprocal basis. I then show that political authority must be adequately controlled in order to avoid the existence of domination. This is why it must be conceived as a fiduciary relationship, in which the rulers act as agents of the citizenry. Finally, I establish the need for rulers to comply with fiduciary duties and for citizens to develop civic virtues. (shrink)

En su discurso del 10 de mayo de 1793 sobre la Constitución, Robespierre combina una concepción fiduciaria de los representantes públicos con una defensa de las virtudes de la democracia, el único sistema político en el que los gobernantes, al ser parte del pueblo, tienen los mismos intereses que este. Es esta defensa de la soberanía popular, así como de la primacía del poder legislativo, lo que constituye la esencia de su “economía política popular”, una expresión que toma de Rousseau. (...) Para Robespierre, solamente esta clase de economía es compatible con una República cuyo primer objetivo sea la garantía de los derechos naturales del hombre. In his 10th May 1793 speech on the Constitution, Robespierre combines a fiduciary conception of public representatives with a defence of the virtues of democracy, the only political system in which the rulers, being part of the people, have the same interests as the latter. It is this defence of popular sovereignty, as well as of the primacy of the legislative power, what constitutes the essence of his “popular political economy”, an expression he takes from Rousseau. For Robespierre, only this kind of economy is compatible with a Republic whose first objective is to guarantee the natural rights of man. (shrink)

Antoni Domènech was one of Spain’s most important political philosophers of the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries. Known primarily as a scholar of republicanism, his work on the concepts of individual liberty and rights complicates standard liberal definitions, which he believed erred in defining these terms independent of institutional context, as pre-political attributes of the individual. He argued that republicanism corrected liberalism’s abstraction by making one’s actually being able to exercise liberty and rights depend on one’s enjoying a sufficiently (...) robust set of material conditions, or on having enough property so that one could always avoid unequal social relationships. (shrink)