Algorithmic predictions are promising for insurance companies to develop personalized risk models for determining premiums. In this context, issues of fairness, discrimination, and social injustice might arise: Algorithms for estimating the risk based on personal data may be biased towards specific social groups, leading to systematic disadvantages for those groups. Personalized premiums may thus lead to discrimination and social injustice. It is well known from many application fields that such biases occur frequently and naturally when prediction models are applied to (...) people unless special efforts are made to avoid them. Insurance is no exception. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of algorithmic fairness in the case of insurance premiums. We ask what “fairness” might mean in this context and how the fairness of a premium system can be measured. For this, we apply the established fairness frameworks of the fair machine learning literature to the case of insurance premiums and show which of the existing fairness criteria can be applied to assess the fairness of insurance premiums. We argue that two of the often-discussed group fairness criteria, independence (also called statistical parity or demographic parity) and separation (also known as equalized odds), are not normatively appropriate for insurance premiums. Instead, we propose the sufficiency criterion (also known as well-calibration) as a morally defensible alternative that allows us to test for systematic biases in premiums towards certain groups based on the risk they bring to the pool. In addition, we clarify the connection between group fairness and different degrees of personalization. Our findings enable insurers to assess the fairness properties of their risk models, helping them avoid reputation damage resulting from potentially unfair and discriminatory premium systems. (shrink)

In actuarial parlance, the price of an insurance policy is considered fair if customers bearing the same risk are charged the same price. The estimate of this fair amount hinges on the expected value obtained by weighting the different claims by their probability. We argue that, historically, this concept of actuarial fairness originates in an Aristotelian principle of justice in exchange (equality in risk). We will examine how this principle was formalized in the 16th century and shaped in life insurance (...) during the following two hundred years, in two different interpretations. The Domatian account of actuarial fairness relied on subjective uncertainty: An agreement on risk was fair if both parties were equally ignorant about the chances of an uncertain event. The objectivist version grounded any agreement on an objective risk estimate drawn from a mortality table. We will show how the objectivist approach collapsed in the market for life annuities during the 18th century, leaving open the question of why we still speak of actuarial fairness as if it were an objective expected value. (shrink)

The recent proliferation of new data and technologies enables increasingly finer personalization of products and prices in every domain. In insurance, this revives and enlarges old debates around fairness that have never been completely settled. We will argue that the commonly accepted “actuarial fairness” as based on the “individual cost of risk” derives in fact from a conflation: while it indicates the average cost for a group of insureds from the perspective of an insurance company—and is therefore sound from a (...) business profitability viewpoint—it is arguable whether it represents the “fair price” for the individual insured. We first show in a historical perspective the intertwinement of conceptions of fairness with knowledge, in order to point to the alternative to actuarial fairness for insurance. We then describe the intrinsic difference between the insured and the insurer when underwriting an insurance contract. Finally, we build on this distinction to discuss the meaning of fairness in insurance prices. We thus hope to re-center the debate around insurance fairness on its underlying solidarity mechanisms rather than technical and actuarial considerations. (shrink)

Public insurance is commonly assimilated with redistributive tools mobilized by the welfare state in the pursuit of an egalitarian ideal. This view contains some truth, since the result of insurance, at a given moment, is the redistribution of resources from the lucky to unlucky. However, Joseph Heath considers that the principle of efficiency provides a better normative explanation and justification of public insurance than the egalitarian account. According to this view, the fact that the state is involved in the provision (...) of specific insurance is explained and justified by the greater efficiency of the state, in comparison with markets, in addressing market failures such as moral hazard or adverse selection. Our argument is that while insurance, intrinsically and idealistically, may diverge from a redistributive scheme, it is nevertheless difficult to deny that insurance has nothing to do with equality. More precisely, we argue that insurance may be understood as an egalitarian tool if our understanding of equality is broadened to include relational equality. Our paper aims to briefly recap the debates surrounding public insurance as a redistributive tool, advancing the idea that public insurance may be a relational egalitarian tool. It then presents a number of relational arguments in favor of the involvement of the state in the provision of specific forms of insurance, arguments that have been overlooked given the domination of luck egalitarian approaches in these debates. (shrink)

The article presents two main arguments. First, we claim that in contemporary societies, insurance enacts peculiar kinds of solidarities as well as inequality and exclusion. Especially important in this respect are life, health, disability and old age pension insurance, both in compulsory and voluntary forms. Second, the article maintains that the ideas of solidarity, inequality and exclusion are transformed by the machinery of insurance. In other words, the concrete ways in which insurance relations are practically arranged have an effect on (...) the ways in which the related moral and political concepts are perceived. We elaborate on three different forms of insurance solidarity, which we call chance, risk and income solidarity. The existence of multiple forms of solidarity relevant to insurance is significant because practices of insurance require decisions concerning what kind of solidarity is emphasised, when it is emphasised, and on what grounds. Moreover, what is solidarity for some can entail exclusion and inequality for others. Showing these internal tensions within insurance practice underlines the inherently political and moral nature of insurance. (shrink)

Informed by a search of the literature about the usage of genetic testing information (GTI) by insurance companies, this paper presents a practical ethical analysis of several distinct public policy options that might be used to govern or constrain GTI usage by insurance providers. As medical research advances and the extension to the Human Genome Project (2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/human_genome_project_-_write) moves to its fullness over the next decade, such research efforts will allow the full synthesis of human DNA to be connected to (...) predictive health dispositions. As testing costs fall, there will be ever more pressure for citizens to disclose GTI. Genetic testing information is integral to future medical care because it can be used to better assess individually tailored medical therapies as well as to allow a more informed risk analysis by the insurance industry, which in some countries such as the USA underwrites a majority of citizen medical expenses. As discussed in this examination, the revelation of people’s uniquely personal GTI to insurers has enormous societal implications. The major contribution of the paper is to offer policy makers and concerned citizens a nuanced articulation of the basic options to regulate GTI, with a special consideration for ethical fairness and equity. As genetic-based medicine blossoms and pressures to reduce healthcare costs increase, there will be an ever greater impetus for countries to revisit their genetic testing policies. Organizations and policy makers striving to create GTI oversights perceived to be both “fair and effective” need to be aware of the ethical perspectives discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Public insurance is both everywhere and nowhere. It is everywhere in the sense that it is omnipresent in industrialised societies: public health insurance, unemployment benefits and pensions. It is a sizeable part of modern nations’ public budget . It has permeated our understanding of societal institutions to the extent that now access to public insurance coverage is understood as being a struggle for equality and equal citizenship .Public insurance is only one aspect of a broader phenomenon: the transformation of modern (...) societies into insurance societies, i.e. societies that are orientated toward risk-management . Nevertheless, public insurance is at the core of the welfare state as insurance system. Paul Krugman once said of the modern state that it is ‘an insurance company with an army’ while David Moss argues that government is the ultimate risk manager ( .. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente, las primas de los contratos de seguros se han considerado justas o equitativas cuando se corresponden exactamente con el riesgo de las pólizas, medido este último mediante la esperanza matemática de la siniestralidad. En este artículo llevamos a cabo una crítica de este enfoque aparentemente objetivo y proponemos una justificación alternativa de la denominada equidad actuarial, basada en argumentos contractualistas. Para ello nos apoyamos en ciertas intuiciones de Jean Domat, un jurista francés del siglo XVII, acerca de la incertidumbre (...) compartida, integradas dentro del marco general proporcionado por la teoría contractualista del economista y filósofo contemporáneo Robert Sugden. (shrink)