Lange argues that the gestationalist approach to moral parenthood fails due to its implausible reliance on a ‘valuable intimate personal relationship between newborn and gestational procreator’ at birth.1 However, his dismissal of the moral significance of the maternal–fetal connection depends largely on inappropriate analogies to other forms of relationship. Further, Lange targets a very specific framing of the gestationalist view, overlooking the significance that many gestationalist accounts grant to maternal interests and experiences. Finally—perhaps due to this asymmetric focus—the version of (...) the Harm Argument with which he engages also fails to recognise as morally significant the harm of forced separation for parents (and especially gestational mothers). When investigating the purported value of the maternal–newborn relationship, Lange argues (plausibly) that the newborn’s experiences are so limited as to cast doubt on the non-instrumental value of this relationship for the newborn, and on the likelihood of harm to the newborn as a result of the interruption of this relationship. However, Lange grants little significance to the gestational mother’s experience of this relationship or her affect towards the fetus/newborn. He does not engage with literature on the epistemically transformative experience of pregnancy,2 nor, strikingly, does he discuss the possible significance of maternal love at birth. In fact, his paper mentions …. (shrink)

Ectogestation technology, when feasible, will permit fetal development within an artificial womb. Ectogestation is termed ectogenesis when it is full (gestation occurs exclusively within an artificial womb post in vitro fertilisation) or partial (artificial gestation occurs during the course of in vivo gestation, post a caesarean-like fetal transfer). In what follows, I explore the implications for the gestational versus moral parenthood debate recently spotlighted by Benjamin Lange1 for various alternative uses of ectogestation compared to the baseline case of in vivo (...) gestation. I contrast ectogestation in four different contexts with in vivo gestation followed by vaginal delivery. I document the relevant outcomes, burdens and harms in particular, to the gestating mother, the biological father, the fetus and the child into whom it will develop. The focus on harms in considering intraparental claims to parenthood follows Lange’s focal article1: importantly, however, I focus not on harms from separation from the gestational procreator (as in adoption cases) but instead on harms arising from the use of ectogestation in various forms. I note at the outset, how, for each case discussed below, I indicate opportunities for each biological parent to establish voluntarism-based claims to moral parenthood. In the analyses, except where specifically noted, the default implication is that it is …. (shrink)

In his article entitled ‘Moral parenthood: not gestational’, Benjamin Lange makes the following central and narrow claim: that moral parenthood cannot be defended fully based on an ‘emotional relationship’ facilitated by gestation.1 By ‘moral parenthood’, Lange appears to mean a moral right to parent the child. The ‘emotional relationship’ under scrutiny seems to be a form of intimate relationship during pregnancy involving an emotional attachment between the pregnant woman (or, in Lange’s terminology, the ‘gestational procreator’) and the newborn. In other (...) words, Lange critiques the view that a moral right to parent a child can be grounded in an emotional relationship, as developed during pregnancy, between the mother and child. Lange discusses the possible emotions of both of them, during pregnancy, and at the time of birth. He notes some problems in seeing this relationship as one that has sufficiently weighty moral importance: it is asymmetrical, for example, and the relationship is not obviously reciprocal. The central claim here is in fact quite easily convincing. It is quite right that emotions alone should not ground a moral right to parent a child. Lange accepts for example that ‘gestational procreators are usually highly emotionally invested in their pregnancy’ (p3),1 and this ‘usually’ …. (shrink)

Some commentators confer the right to children on those who gestate them because of the personal intimate relationship they say obtains in gestation.1 Benjamin Lange criticises two variants of that argument.2 He argues against the view that gestation creates a sui generis relationship that in its distinctiveness confers the right to the child on its gestator and the right of the child to its gestator. He also argues against the view that gestation involves a relationship whose dissolution necessarily causes morally (...) significant harm. I do not dispute these lines of reasoning, but the analysis goes further than Lange indicates. The reasons that Lange deploy to reject the relationship involved in gestation as conferring any kind of proprietary right to children also undercut that relationship as a ground of a presumptive duty towards those children. In the first instance, Lange disputes the idea that gestation produces a non-instrumental good that both the gestator and child have an interest in maintaining. In part, he argues that this kind of relationship lacks the emotional complexity, intimacy and intensity that underwrite other kinds of relationships, namely the very qualities that constitute the value of those relationships. More tellingly, he says, there is no unambiguous evidence that …. (shrink)