Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Gestation most certainly matters, but it need not involve an ‘emotional relationship’.Heloise Robinson - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    In his article entitled ‘Moral parenthood: not gestational’, Benjamin Lange makes the following central and narrow claim: that moral parenthood cannot be defended fully based on an ‘emotional relationship’ facilitated by gestation.1 By ‘moral parenthood’, Lange appears to mean a moral right to parent the child. The ‘emotional relationship’ under scrutiny seems to be a form of intimate relationship during pregnancy involving an emotional attachment between the pregnant woman (or, in Lange’s terminology, the ‘gestational procreator’) and the newborn. In other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How ectogestation can impact the gestational versus moral parenthood debate.James J. Cordeiro - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Ectogestation technology, when feasible, will permit fetal development within an artificial womb. Ectogestation is termed ectogenesis when it is full (gestation occurs exclusively within an artificial womb post in vitro fertilisation) or partial (artificial gestation occurs during the course of in vivo gestation, post a caesarean-like fetal transfer). In what follows, I explore the implications for the gestational versus moral parenthood debate recently spotlighted by Benjamin Lange1 for various alternative uses of ectogestation compared to the baseline case of in vivo (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • If not a right to children because of gestation, then not a duty towards them either.Timothy F. Murphy - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Some commentators confer the right to children on those who gestate them because of the personal intimate relationship they say obtains in gestation.1 Benjamin Lange criticises two variants of that argument.2 He argues against the view that gestation creates a sui generis relationship that in its distinctiveness confers the right to the child on its gestator and the right of the child to its gestator. He also argues against the view that gestation involves a relationship whose dissolution necessarily causes morally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Acknowledging the dual-interest gestationalist approach.Teresa Baron - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Lange argues that the gestationalist approach to moral parenthood fails due to its implausible reliance on a ‘valuable intimate personal relationship between newborn and gestational procreator’ at birth.1 However, his dismissal of the moral significance of the maternal–fetal connection depends largely on inappropriate analogies to other forms of relationship. Further, Lange targets a very specific framing of the gestationalist view, overlooking the significance that many gestationalist accounts grant to maternal interests and experiences. Finally—perhaps due to this asymmetric focus—the version of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark