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  1. Reliability: An Introduction.Stefano Bonzio, Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S23):5615-5624.
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  • Reliability: An Introduction.Stefano Bonzio, Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 23):1-10.
    How we can reliably draw inferences from data, evidence and/or experience has been and continues to be a pressing question in everyday life, the sciences, politics and a number of branches in philosophy (traditional epistemology, social epistemology, formal epistemology, logic and philosophy of the sciences). In a world in which we can now longer fully rely on our experiences, interlocutors, measurement instruments, data collection and storage systems and even news outlets to draw reliable inferences, the issue becomes even more pressing. (...)
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  • Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.
    Varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys long-standing widespread intuitive support. Recent literature has raised serious doubts that the correlational approach of explicating the thesis can vindicate it. By contrast, the eliminative approach due to Horwich vindicates the Variety of Evidence Thesis but only within a relatively narrow domain. I investigate the prospects of extending the eliminative approach to a larger domain by considering a larger (...)
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  • On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias.Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4):525-549.
    Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.
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