Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...) when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivisation duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivisation duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)

In his new book, Ames defends his interpretation of Confucian ethics as "role ethics" through a detailed examination of the Confucian vocabulary. Through such vocabulary, we can see that the Confucian self is a being that cultivates itself as it lives and matures in the context of the family and society. As role ethics, Confucianism is distinct from the Western tradition and its Greek roots. However, in order to highlight the contrast between Confucianism and the Western tradition, Ames paints a (...) picture of the latter that is a little misleading. As it turns out, there are many strands in the Western philosophical fabric, including those in the Continental tradition, where we can find conceptions of the self not all that different from what is in Confucianism as interpreted by Ames. Content Type Journal Article Pages 141-150 Authors A. T. Nuyen, National University of Singapore Journal Comparative and Continental Philosophy Online ISSN 1757-0646 Print ISSN 1757-0638 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1 / 2012. (shrink)