The final lines of Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? call for a non-philosophy to balance and act as a counterweight to the task of philosophy that had been described by them in terms of concept creation. In a footnote, Deleuze and Guattari mention François Laruelle’s project of non-philosophy, but dispute its efficacy in terms of the designated relationship between non-philosophy and science, as had been realised by Laruelle at the time. However, the mature non-philosophy of Laruelle could indicate a (...) resolution to the problematic relationship between science and educational philosophy that we have inherited due to the poststructural theories of Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze. Non-philosophy suggests a framework for thought that includes science in a non-positivist style and provides the means to view education as a performative practice. This article explores the non-philosophy of Laruelle in education as a means to view education under the conditions of strict immanence and in line with an anti-phenomenological metaphysics of non-representation. Laruelle is perhaps one of the most important critics of Deleuze in France, and as such, his insights into the Deleuzian oeuvre reveal a way forward for education as a practice that analyses science, philosophy and politics through non-philosophy. (shrink)

There is an aporia to finitude: if I am limited as a finite being, I cannot know what the limits of my finitude are, because if I knew what those limits are, then I would have transcended them. I refer to this aporia as the "hard problem of finitude," interpreted through Graham Priest's work on inclosure paradoxes. Here I offer an interpretation of François Laruelle's theory of the Philosophical Decision in terms of his attempt to resolve this aporia through his (...) suspension of standard philosophy's form of ontological dualism. Next, I apply non-standard philosophy to the problem of religious pluralism, presenting a novel theory of "standard religion" and the "Hierophanic Decision" through a non-standard reading of Mircea Eliade's philosophy of religion, and end by pointing towards what a consistently performative and finite form of religious pluralism might look like from within the "democracy-of-thought," here rendered as the "parliament of religions.". (shrink)

This essay begins by examining the identity of tradition, arguing that traditions as contemporarily conceived cast themselves as an end rather than as a means. This takes place through a consideration of the writing of MacIntyre before turning to a non-philosophical interpretation of tradition as a kind of theological decision centred on the question of a power principle. This opens up to an explanation of the concept of weaponized apophaticism, which describes the way in which traditions cast themselves as an (...) end through a process of theological claims to authority that are ultimately made all the more powerful through a process of deferral. The essay then concludes with a discussion of gnosis as a kind of non-tradition, a generalized form of tradition which escapes being mistaken or “hallucinated; as an end because of gnosis's being cast as prior to origin. Tradition is revealed in its identity through gnostic refusal, which ultimately illuminates the consequences and meaning of what we are terming the first axiom for a nontheology to be completed in a future project. (shrink)