In an ongoing dialogue, Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events would require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has intervened in earthly affairs. I argue that there is no reason to believe that a nontheist who acknowledged certain healings to be strong evidence for theism but did not see such evidence as outweighing what she viewed as the stronger counterevidence, and thus remained a nontheist, could justifiably be accused of (...) adopting a dogmatic, uncritical question-begging stance. (shrink)

In "Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God," (’Southern Journal of Philosophy’, 1985) Christine Overall argued that the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against the existence of God, on the grounds that miracles are violations of natural law or permanently inexplicable events and, as such, would be inconsistent with the supposed purposes of God. In ’Water Into Wine?’ (MacGill-Queen’s, 1988), I argued that her argument fails once a more adequate definition of miracle is adopted. In "Miracles and God: (...) A Reply to Robert A.H. Larmer" (’Dialogue’ 1997), Overall attempted to reply to my specific criticisms and to attack central theses of ’Water Into Wine?’. I argue that she is successful in neither endeavor. (shrink)

IN HIS ARTICLE "MIRACLES AND NATURAL EXPLANATION" DAVID BASINGER TAKES ISSUE WITH THE CLAIM I ADVANCED IN MY EARLIER ARTICLE "MIRACLES AND CRITERIA" THAT ONLY A DOGMATIC AND UNCRITICAL ASSUMPTION THAT NATURE IS IN FACT AN ISOLATED SYSTEM CAN EXPLAIN THE INSISTENCE OF SOME PHILOSOPHERS THAT, NO MATTER WHAT THE EVENT AND NO MATTER WHAT THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT OCCURS, IT IS ALWAYS MORE RATIONAL TO LIVE IN THE FAITH THAT SUCH AN EVENT HAS A NATURAL EXPLANATION RATHER THAN (...) BELIEVE IT A MIRACLE. BASINGER URGES THAT MY ARGUMENT CONTAINS TWO BASIC CONFUSIONS. IN REPLY, I ARGUE THAT BOTH HIS OBJECTIONS ARE MISTAKEN. (shrink)

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

In an ongoing dialogue, Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events--for instance, astonishing healings--could require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has supernaturally intervened in earthly affairs. I have not denied that a theist could justifiably consider the occurrence of certain possible (or even actual) events to be strong evidence for theism. But in this essay I continue to deny that the occurrence of any conceivable event would require the acknowledgement (...) of divine intervention by all rational individuals. (shrink)

IN A RECENT DISCUSSION ON THE MIRACULOUS, ROBERT LARMER ARGUES THAT THERE ARE CONCEIVABLE OCCURRENCES FOR WHICH IT WOULD BE MOST REASONABLE TO BELIEVE NO NATURAL EXPLANATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING. IN RESPONSE I ARGUE THAT THERE ARE NO SUCH OCCURRENCES. IT IS, IN PRINCIPLE, ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT ANY CONCEIVABLE EVENT IS THE PRODUCT OF SOLELY NATURAL CAUSAL FACTORS.