The pragmatic political liberal in my conception approaches the political realm as an arena within which the boundaries of reasonableness, and thus of legitimate state action, are worked out through public inquiry over time. I therefore hold that the political liberal claim that public policies must be publicly justified does not mean that the policies in question must be shown to be immune to reasonable disagreement, but rather that they be shown to be reasonable candidates for public inquiry. While I (...) have doubts about the attractiveness and viability of ‘Deweyan’ democracy as a political program, I think that it is a reasonable candidate for public action in this sense. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente texto trata de la teoría de Charles Larmore, más precisamente, de las relaciones entre las concepciones de desacuerdo razonable, de pluralismo y de liberalismo. Tal teoría tiene como características el intuicionismo racional, contextualismo y defiende una posición realista de la moralidad. Palabras clave: desacuerdo razonable, pluralismo, liberalismo, intuicionismo, contextualismo.

Michelman's Constitutional Essentials raises important questions about the idea of political liberalism and related idea of public reason. This essay offers a sympathetic commentary while also exploring the importance of the idea of reciprocity for both Rawls and Michelman.

Varios autores afines al proyecto del liberalismo político han propuesto diferentes modelos de razón pública para enfrentar la situación de desacuerdo moral permanente en las sociedades liberales. En este trabajo presentamos un modelo que defiende dos argumentos. Primero, argumentamos a favor de una interpretación deflacionista de las razones que son aceptables para los ciudadanos razonables. Segundo, introducimos una nueva terminología que distingue entre lo que llamamos razones dependientes, accesibles y aceptables. Sostenemos que sólo las segundas y las terceras son medios (...) adecuados de discusión dentro de la razón pública, y las terceras son un estándar correcto de justificación de política pública. (shrink)

I argue that both major approaches to public reason liberalism include duties of restraint for legislators. Consensus views require exclusion of non-public reasons, and convergence requires proposal restraint. Violations of these duties create due diligence duties of moral repair, which require the wrongdoer to make a genuine and reasonable effort to normalize moral relations with those wronged. I argue that apology is one favorable route for moral repair. However, it is difficult to assess the sincerity of apologies, so they often (...) need supplemented with other morally compensatory actions. I defend the view that, on consensus accounts, legislators must provide a renewed defense of their positions in terms of public reasons, and, on convergence accounts, legislators must retract their support for positions that violate convergent restraint. (shrink)

O artigo aborda a discussão entre John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas no que diz respeito ao processo democrático e à neutralidade. Indica que a formação do processo democrático acontece de maneira distinta em uma perspectiva liberal e republicana e que ambos os autores assimilam essa questão de forma diferente. No que se refere à neutralidade, embora tanto Rawls quanto Habermas defendam uma prioridade do justo sobre o bem, o intuito é mostrar que as implicações derivadas de suas perspectivas também são (...) distintas. Trata-se de uma das críticas fundamentais de Habermas a Rawls e um dos principais pontos de desacordo entre as duas perspectivas sobre o liberalismo político. (shrink)