The question about divine action remains contested in the discussion between theology and science. This issue is further exacerbated with the entry of pentecostals and charismatics into the conversation, especially with their emphases on divine intervention and miracles. I explore what happens at the intersection of these discourses, identifying first how the concept of "laws of nature" has developed in theology and science and then probing what pentecostal-charismatic insights might add into the mix. Drawing from the triadic and evolutionary metaphysics (...) of Charles Sanders Peirce, I propose a reconsideration of the "laws of nature" as habitual, dynamic, and general but nevertheless real tendencies through which the Holy Spirit invites the world to inhabit the coming kingdom of God. This proposal contributes to the articulation of an authentic Pentecostal-charismatic witness at the theology-and-science table while also enabling a more plausible and coherent account of divine action for pentecostal-charismatic piety and Christian practice in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Patient and family demands for the initiation or continuation of life-sustaining medically non-beneficial treatments continues to be a major issue. This is especially relevant in intensive care units, but is also a challenge in other settings, most notably with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Differences of opinion between physicians and patients/families about what are appropriate interventions in specific clinical situations are often fraught with highly strained emotions, and perhaps none more so when the family bases their desires on religious belief. In this essay, (...) I discuss non-beneficial treatments in light of these sorts of disputes, when there is a clash between the nominally secular world of fact- and evidence-based medicine and the faith-based world of hope for a miraculous cure. I ask the question whether religious belief can justify providing treatment that has either no or a vanishly small chance of restoring meaningful function. I conclude that non-beneficial therapy by its very definition cannot be helpful, and indeed is often harmful, to patients and hence cannot be justified no matter what the source or kind of reasons used to support its use. Therefore, doctors may legitimately refuse to provide such treatments, so long as they do so for acceptable clinical reasons. They must also offer alternatives, including second opinions, as well the option of transferring the care of the patient to a more accommodating physician or institution. (shrink)

What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people’s miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...) beneficial occurrences that instill hope and faith in people. Studies 2 and 3 investigated people’s intuitive miracle theories. Findings demonstrated that people tend to label events as miracles when the events in question were of high magnitude, were obtained in an unusual manner, resulted in a beneficial health outcome, personally affected the participant, involved a person of worthy character, and depicted a low-probability event. (shrink)

Dans cette réplique à l’article de Frank Jankunis, «Overall and Larmer on Miracles as Evidence for the Existence of God», je traite du concept de miracle comme violation de la loi naturelle. Je soutiens que, s’il advenait un miracle, ce serait un mal épistémique, ontique et moral, et, par conséquent, une preuve qu’il n’existe pas de Dieu parfait.

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

As this article is published, Robert Larmer and I have been engaged in a debate that is now eighteen years long, often with gaps of many years between ripostes, about the nature and significance of miracles. The Larmer/overall oeuvre now includes six works, including the two published here. I am grateful to the editors of Dialogue for giving me the opportunity to respond to Larmer’s most recent entry in the debate.

This paper is the latest in a debate with Robert Larmer as to whether the occurrence of a miracle would provide evidence for the existence of God or against the existence of God. Whereas Larmer’s view is categorical (miracles occur and are evidence for the existence of God), mine is hypothetical (if the events typically described as miracles were to occur -- although I do not believe they do -- they would be evidence against the existence of God). The reason (...) is that miracles, if they were to occur, would be ontic, epistemic, and moral evils. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Goal and Scope of the Argument The Concept of a Miracle Textual Assumptions Background Facts: Death and Burial The Salient Facts: W, D, and P Probabilistic Cumulative Case Arguments: Nature and Structure The Testimony of the Women: Bayes Factor Analysis The Testimony of the Disciples: Bayes Factor Analysis The Conversion of Paul: Bayes Factor Analysis The Collective Force of the Salient Facts Independence Hume's Maxim and Worldview Worries Plantinga's Principle of Dwindling Probabilities Knavery, Folly, (...) and the Love of Wonder Conclusion References. (shrink)

In his book, "Water into Wine," Robert Larmer argues that miracles can occur as divine interventions in the world without involving any change or suspension of the laws of nature. They may do this by the direct creation or destruction of some of the basic ’stuff’ of the universe, while it continues to conform to the unaltered laws. This paper, on the contrary, claims that conservation is essential to the concept of the ’stuff’ as being basic, and that changes in (...) its total quantity therefore undermine the laws of nature just as seriously as any other conflicting evidence. (shrink)

In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly, I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive than Mumford’s causation-based definition.

In this paper, a candidate necessary condition of a miracle is introduced: the direct restriction. The direct restriction holds that all miraculous effects have direct non-natural causes.

Miracles and the problem of evil are two prominent areas of research within philosophy of religion. On occasion these areas converge, with God’s goodness being brought into question by the claim that either there is a lack of miracles, or there are immoral miracles. In this paper I shall highlight a second manner in which miracles and the problem of evil relate. Namely, I shall give reason as to why what is considered to be miraculous may be dependent upon a (...) particular response to the problem of natural evil. To establish this claim, I shall focus upon Aquinas’s definition of a miracle and a particular free-will defence, the Luciferous defence. (shrink)

In "Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God," (’Southern Journal of Philosophy’, 1985) Christine Overall argued that the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against the existence of God, on the grounds that miracles are violations of natural law or permanently inexplicable events and, as such, would be inconsistent with the supposed purposes of God. In ’Water Into Wine?’ (MacGill-Queen’s, 1988), I argued that her argument fails once a more adequate definition of miracle is adopted. In "Miracles and God: (...) A Reply to Robert A.H. Larmer" (’Dialogue’ 1997), Overall attempted to reply to my specific criticisms and to attack central theses of ’Water Into Wine?’. I argue that she is successful in neither endeavor. (shrink)

A favoured argument of many of the eighteenth-century Deists was that the concept of miracle is inconsistent with the supposed perfection of God and thus the occurrence of miracles would constitute evidence against, rather than for, God. In the latter part of the twentieth century we meet very similar arguments in the writings of Christine Overall and James Keller who claim that the occurrence of miracles would imply an arbitrariness and caprice unworthy of a divine agent.

Dans cet article, je réponds aux critiques formulées par Frank Jankunis à l'endroit de mes arguments concernant la force probante fournie au théisme par les événements perçus avantageusement comme des miracles.

In a recent article, Neil MacGill criticizes my claim (See "Water Into Wine", MacGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988) that miracles, understood as a transcendent agent overriding the usual course of nature, can conceivably occur without violating or suspending any of the laws of nature. MacGill feels that my account of miracles implies the violation of at least one law of nature, the Principle of the Conservation of Energy. In my reply, I point out that he is mistaken and that my original (...) claim has not, therefore, been refuted. (shrink)

Christian Overall and I have been debating whether the occurrence of events traditionally viewed as miracles would constitute evidence for theism. In this article, I make some concluding comments regarding our exchanges. My goal in making these comments is twofold. First, I wish to sketch why I think miracles can function as evidence for God. Second, in the course of our discussion, Overall has ascribed to me claims that I do not make and criticized me on the basis of my (...) holding these views. I feel it is important to set the record straight on several issues. (shrink)

Si un miracle se produisait, cela serait-il une preuve de l’existence de Dieu ou, au contraire, de son inexistence? Christine Overall et Robert Larmer débattent de cette question depuis plusieurs années. Dans cet article, je soutiens que leurs comptes rendus positifs des positions de l’autre ne sont pas tout à fait satisfaisants. Je soutiens également que certaines critiques importantes qu’ils formulent l’un contre l’autre ratent la cible. Je propose ensuite de faire avancer le débat en identifiant et en synthétisant ce (...) qui est correct dans leurs comptes rendus respectifs. (shrink)

Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist (...) reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues. (shrink)

What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people's miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...) beneficial occurrences that instill hope and faith in people. Studies 2 and 3 investigated people's intuitive miracle theories. Findings demonstrated that people tend to label events as miracles when the events in question were of high magnitude, were obtained in an unusual manner, resulted in a beneficial health outcome, personally affected the participant, involved a person of worthy character, and depicted a low-probability event. (shrink)

Some argue for materialism claiming that a physical event cannot have a non-physical cause, or by claiming the 'Principle of Causal Closure' to be true. This I call a 'Sweeping Naturalistic Argument'. This article argues against this. It describes what it would be for a material event to have an immaterial cause.