Donald Davidson used triangulation to do everything from explicate psychological and semantic externalism, to attack relativism and skepticism, to propose conditions necessary for thought and talk. At one point Davidson tried to bring order to these remarks by identifying three kinds of triangulation, each operative in a different situation. Here I take seriously Davidson’s talk of triangular situations and extend it. I start by describing Davidson’s situations. Next I establish the surprising result that considerations from one situation entail the possibility (...) that at any one time one language is partially untranslatable into another. Because the possibility is time-indexed, it need not conflict with Davidson’s own argument against the possibility of untranslatability. I derive the result, not to indict Davidson, but to propose a new kind of triangulation, the reconciliation of untranslatability, which I investigate. Insofar as triangulation is central to Davidson’s views, getting a handle on his various triangular situations is key to getting a handle on his contributions to philosophy. Insofar as those contributions have enriched our understanding of how language, thought, and reality interrelate, extending Davidson’s model promises to extend our understanding too. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss language learning in Wittgenstein and Davidson. Starting from a remark by Bakhurst, I hold that both Wittgenstein and Davidson’s philosophies of language contain responses to the problem of language learning, albeit of a different form. Following Williams, I hold that the concept of language learning can explain Wittgenstein’s approach to the normativity of meaning in the Philosophical Investigations. Turning to Davidson, I hold that language learning can, equally, explain Davidson’s theory of triangulation. I sketch an (...) account of triangulation as Davidson’s response to the problem of the normativity of meaning and explain the role that language learning plays in this account. (shrink)

Early in his career, Donald Davidson criticized what he termed the ‘Third Dogma of Empiricism,’ namely, the idea that a rigid distinction can be drawn between conceptualizing scheme and empirical content. Later on in his career, Davidson developed a theory of triangulation in order to explain how successful communication is possible. In this paper, I identify two interpretations of Davidsonian triangulation – the Causal-Similarity View and the Constitutive Interpretation. After highlighting some problems with the Causal-Similarity View, I question whether the (...) Constitutive Interpretation requires implementing the scheme/content distinction Davidson rejected in his earlier writings. Ultimately, I argue that, by drawing from Davidson’s principle of charity and his notion of a passing theory, the Constitutive Interpretation of triangulation does not require the scheme/content distinction and so the early and later theories of Davidson do not come into conflict. (shrink)