In this paper, the potentials of systematically linking philosophy of science with bibliometrics are investigated by exploring whether concepts developed within the structuralist theory of science can be used as interpretative basis for author co-citation studies. It is argued that clusters of co-cited authors cannot be interpreted straightforwardly as scientific communities nor as scientific generations. The first reason is that the respective constituents differ (authors vs. scientists), the second is that the co-citation relation generates non-Kuhnian communities, i.e. communities not sharing (...) a paradigm/theory-core. Instead, co-citation clusters can more adequately be taken to represent communities of common (epistemic) interest. Hence, the concepts of interest community and of discourse community are introduced into the structuralist framework making use of the notion of intended application. All in all, it becomes clear that a full-fledged theory of publication is the still missing prerequisite for further linking bibliometrics and philosophy of science at a large scale. (shrink)

The following investigation illustrates, by concrete historical examples, some of the basic results, outlined in earlier papers on theory evolution and reference dynamics in science (cf. Balzer, W. et al.: 1989, 'A Static Theory of Reference in Science', Synthese 79, 319-360; Lauth, B.: 1989, 'Reference Problems in Stoichiometry', Erkenntnis 30, 339-362; Lauth, B.: 1990, 'Theory Evolution and Reference Kinematics', Synthese 88, 279-307). All theories considered in this paper are represented within a metatheoretical frame that has become known as the structuralist (...) view in the philosophy of science. The paper focusses on some physical constants, namely the mass and charge of electrons, henceforth denoted by m₀ and e₀, of Boltzmann's constant k, Faraday's constant F and Avogadro's Number ${\rm N}_{{\rm A}}$ , and the evolution of their 'reference spectra' from the beginning of the 19th century until the early days of quantum physics. (shrink)

A comprehensive model for describing various forms of developments in science is defined in precise, set-theoretic terms, and in the spirit of the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. The model emends previous accounts in centering on single systems in a homogenous way, eliminating notions which essentially refer to sets of systems. This is achieved by eliminating the distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as a primitive, and by introducing the notion of intended links. The force of the model (...) is demonstrated by formally incorporating many of the important, precise meta-theoretic concepts occurring in the literature. (shrink)