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  1. Kant’s Enlightenment and Women’s Peculiar Immaturity.Charlotte Sabourin - 2021 - Kantian Review 26 (2):235-260.
    In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Kant claims that no women are currently enlightened. Here I argue that this exclusion is due to certain legal restrictions guiding Kant’s conception of enlightenment. As enlightenment is intended to take place in society, it appears that Kant has a specific legal context in mind that affects its enactment. His twofold conception of citizenship and the dimension of subordination he puts forward by restricting the private use of reason will prove useful in clarifying those legal restrictions. (...)
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  • Responding to vulnerability: The case of injection drug use.Elizabeth Ben-Ishai - 2012 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 5 (2):39-63.
    This article examines the case of Insite, North America’s only supervised injection facility, to consider the relationship between dependence, relational autonomy, and vulnerability. At state-funded Insite, users inject illicit drugs under medical supervision. By conceiving of Insite as a health-care facility and addiction as disease, advocates evoke a shared sense of vulnerability among the nonusing public and users, garnering considerable support for the site. Through Insite, the state responds to vulnerability by reshaping the meaning of dependence and conferring recognition upon (...)
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  • Kant and Women.Helga Varden - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):653-694.
    Kant's conception of women is complex. Although he struggles to bring his considered view of women into focus, a sympathetic reading shows it not to be anti-feminist and to contain important arguments regarding human nature. Kant believes the traditional male-female distinction is unlikely to disappear, but he never proposes the traditional gender ideal as the moral ideal; he rejects the idea that such considerations of philosophical anthropology can set the framework for morality. This is also why his moral works clarifies (...)
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  • The Child as Co-researcher—Moral and Epistemological Issues in Childhood Research.Elisabeth Willumsen, Jon Vegar Hugaas & Ingunn Studsrød - 2014 - Ethics and Social Welfare 8 (4):332-349.
    This article discusses whether a child can and should be engaged as a co-researcher on moral and epistemological grounds. Selected research literature has been used to illustrate various approaches to the issue of children's participating as co-researchers in social research. By exploring the predicament of childhood and the meaning of the concept ‘research’, we attempt to clarify the necessary conditions for a person to qualify as a researcher and for an activity to qualify as research. We then look at the (...)
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  • The Case for the Moral Permissibility of Amnesties: An Argument from Social Moral Epistemology.Juan Espindola - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):971-985.
    This paper makes the case for the permissibility of post-conflict amnesties, although not on prudential grounds. It argues that amnesties of a certain scope, targeted to certain categories of perpetrators, and offered in certain contexts are morally permissible because they are an acknowledgment of the difficulty of attributing criminal responsibility in mass violence contexts. Based on this idea, the paper develops the further claim that deciding which amnesties are permissible and which ones are not should be decided on a case-by-case (...)
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  • Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations: Why justice is impossible in the state of nature.Helga Varden - 2008 - Kantian Review 13 (2):1-45.
    This paper presents and defends Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obligations. I argue that civil society is not primarily a prudential requirement for justice; it is not merely a necessary evil or moral response to combat our corrupting nature or our tendency to act viciously, thoughtlessly or in a biased manner. Rather, civil society is constitutive of rightful relations because only in civil society can we interact in ways reconcilable with each person’s innate right to freedom. Civil society is the (...)
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