Awareness and concern about climate change are widespread. But rates of pro-environmental behaviour are low. This is partly due to the way in which pro-environmental behaviour is framed—as a sacrifice or burden that individuals bear for the planet and future generations. This framing elicits well-known cognitive biases, discouraging what we should be encouraging. We should abandon the self-sacrifice framing, and instead frame pro-environmental behaviour as intrinsically desirable. There is a large body of evidence that, around the world, people who are (...) living more environmentally lifestyles are happier than those not doing so. This is the message we should be spreading. (shrink)

John Broome and Duncan Foley have proposed an ingenious way to transfer benefits backwards in time, from people who are not here yet to people who will not be here in the future. Present people can crowd out conventional, and often brown, investments by issuing global climate bonds (GCBs). The debate about GCBs has focused on whether it is justified to use this financial instrument to allow future people to buy off present people for climate mitigation. In this article, I (...) ask whether it is fair to use GCBs to share the cost of a global carbon price between present and future people. My answer is that it depends on the approach used to calculate the carbon price and, of course, on the normative claims underlying the different approaches. Specifically, I argue that the internalisation principle underlying the cost-benefit approach does not justify intergenerational cost-shifting if, as in most cases, the social cost of carbon is determined using, inter alia, a social discount rate. Instead, the conservative justifications underlying a cost-effective carbon price consistent with the Paris mitigation target allow for intergenerational cost-shifting, but only to the extent of the difference (if any) between the Paris-consistent and the Pareto-efficient carbon price. (shrink)

At a time when fossil fuel burning, nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and other retrograde steps are being promoted, the prospects for world peace and environmental systems stability may appear dim. Exactly because of this is it the more important to continue to examine the sources of conflict. A major obstacle to general progress is the currently dominant economic practice and theory, which is here called the economy-as-usual, or economics-as-usual, as appropriate. A special obstacle to constructive change is the language (...) in which economic matters are usually discussed. This language is narrow, conservative, technical and often obscure. The rapid changes in the environment are largely kept in a separate compartment. If, however, the partition is removed, economics-as-usual, with its dependence on growth and its widening inequality, is seen to be unsustainable. Radical economic change, for better or worse, is to be expected. Such change is here called economy change. The change could be for the better if it involved an expansion of the concept of economics itself, along the lines of oikonomia, a modern revival of a classical Greek term for management or household. In such an expanded view, not everything of economic value can be measured. It is argued that economics-as-usual is the source of much strife. Some features are indicated of a less conflictual economy—more just, cooperative and peaceful. These features include a dignified life available to all people as of right, the word ‘wealth’ being reconnected with weal, well and well-being, and ‘work’ being understood as including all useful activity. (shrink)

I contend that to be politically feasible a global climate treaty must satisfy the International Paretian principle (IP). I begin by defending IP as a principle of instrumental rationality that reflects the fact of extremely limited altruism vis-à-vis foreigners. I then address two objections to my thesis. One holds that an IP treaty is either economically infeasible or, contrary to its proponents’ claim, does not require side payments from poor states to rich ones. The other holds poor states will reject (...) any climate treaty that requires such side payments because it ignores or exacerbates their unjust treatment by rich states. (shrink)