The eminent French biologist and historian of biology François Jacob once notoriously declared, “On n’interroge plus la vie dans les laboratoires” : 20-25): laboratory research no longer inquires into the notion of ‘Life’. In the mid-twentieth century, from the immediate post-war period to the late 1960s, French philosophers of science such as Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert Simondon returned to Jacob’s statement with an odd kind of pathos: they were determined to reverse course. Not by imposing a different kind (...) of research program in laboratories, but by an unusual combination of historical and philosophical inquiry into the foundations of the life sciences – a project that at the time was termed ‘biophilosophy’, although this proved to be a short-lived term, as a kind of ‘alternate paradigm’ with respect to mainstream philosophy of biology, as Jean Gayon has noted. Even in as scholarly a work as La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, Canguilhem speaks oddly of “defending vitalist biology,” and declares that “la vie déconcerte la logique.” Was all this historical and philosophical work merely a reassertion of some ‘magical’ vitalism? Indeed, Canguilhem credits Bergson’s ‘thinking of life’ as well. In order to answer this question we need to achieve some perspective on Canguilhem’s ‘vitalism’, notably with respect to its philosophical influences including a Bergsonian legacy, not least since Canguilhem was first an anti-vitalist, anti-Bergsonian, as Giuseppe Bianco has described, but then evolved into his own idiosyncratic brand of vitalism, in which life “is concept”. Did this make Canguilhem more or less of a ‘biophilosopher’? A vitalist like Bergson, or differently? These are the issues addressed in this paper. (shrink)